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RECENT PROPOSALS FOR CONCERTED ACTION
AGAINST STATES IN RESPECT OF UNLAWFUL
INTERFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION
GERALD

F.

FITZGERALD*

INTRODUCTION

Preliminaryremarks

T

HE CASE of the person who unlawfully seizes an aircraft and

takes it to a country which gives him refuge and detains the
aircraft, passengers, crew and cargo and that of a terrorist who
perpetrates an act of violence against civil aviation (e.g., through
an attack on an airport or an airport installation) and seeks refuge
in a country which refuses to extradite or prosecute him could involve contravention by those countries of the provisions of the
Tokyo,' Hague' and Montreal" Conventions which are intended to
ensure that no malefactor should go unpunished and that the aircraft, passengers, crew and cargo should all be permitted to go on
their way. Hence, from mid-1970 to mid-1971, the International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) attempted, almost frenetically,
to develop internationally-agreed procedures for ensuring that States
* B.C.L., University of New Brunswick; Ph.D., University of Ottawa; LL.D.
(Hon.), St. Thomas University. Formerly Principal Legal Officer with the International Civil Aviation Organization where he served from 1946 to mid-1974
and Lecturer, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University (1958-1974).
Now with the Department of Justice, Ottawa. Responsibility for views expressed
is that of the author. This article was written before his entry into the Department of Justice.
I Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 (1963). See 2 INT'L LEG. MAT.
1042 (1963); 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 566-73 (1964); 70 U.N.T.S. 10106 (1969).
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, ICAO Doc. No. 8920 (1970). See 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 133-36 (1971).
8 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, ICAO Doc. No. 8966 (1971). See 10 INT'L LEG.
MAT. 1151-56 (1971).
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would observe their obligations under these Conventions with respect to acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation. The ICAO Council, the Legal Committee and a Legal Subcommittee took part in these efforts (described elsewhere by this
writer') which in mid-1971 were brought to an abrupt halt by a
hotly-disputed political decision of the ICAO Assembly to give the
subject a low priority in the work program of the Legal Committee.
Later, in mid-1972, the subject was revived.
The purpose of the present note is to describe further steps which
have taken place between mid-June 1972 and September 1973 with
a view to developing provisions on joint action against States found
in default of their international obligations in respect of unlawful
interference with international civil aviation and to describe, in particular, the issues arising during the two unsuccessful major meetings on the subject of joint action held at Rome in August-September 1973.
The Crisis in 1972
In July 1971, the ICAO Assembly placed the item concerning
joint action against States in default under the Tokyo, Hague and
Montreal Conventions in the non-current part of the work program
of the ICAO Legal Committee and in effect shelved the item for
an indefinite period. However, in late May and early June, 1972,
a series of spectacular incidents involving unlawful interference
with civil aviation caused a public outcry, particularly from the
International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations (IFALPA),
for urgent action to eliminate such incidents.'
"See FitzGerald, Toward Legal Suppression of Acts Against Civil Aviation,
585 INT'L CONCILIATION 42, 76-78 (1971) and FitzGerald, Concerted Action
Against States Found in Default of Their InternationalObligations in Respect of
Unlawful Interference with International Civil Action, 10 CAN. YEARBOOK INT'L

L. 261 (1972).
- In late May-June 1972, there were some spectacular incidents involving unlawful interference with civil aviation, including the Lod Airport massacre on
May 30, during which Japanese gunmen acting for Arab extremists killed 26 persons and wounded some 80 others. Three weeks earlier a Belgian airliner had
been hijacked at Lod Airport. This hijacking followed the many other attacks

on and hijackings of airliners by Arab extremists in recent years. A United States
airliner had been hijacked to Algeria at the beginning of June after the hijackers
had extorted $500,000 from the airline concerned. On June 8, a hijacked Czechoslovak airliner was diverted to West Germany after one of its co-pilots had been
shot dead. See 18 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, Aug. 5-12, 1972, at 25408.
(For the details of the Belgian airliner hijacking, which lasted for the period
May 8-9 and ended when the aircraft was stormed by about a dozen Israeli corn-
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On June 19, 1972, the ICAO Council, convened in urgent session, adopted a Resolution in which, inter alia, it directed
the Legal Committee to convene immediately a special subcommittee to work on the preparation of an international convention to
establish appropriate multilateral procedures within the ICAO
framework for determining whether there is a need for joint action
in cases envisaged in the first Resolution adopted by the Council
on October 1, 1970' and for deciding on the nature of the joint
action if it is to be taken.'
The key words in the Council Resolution of June 19, 1972 were
"within the ICAO framework" and their significance will be discussed below.
On June 20, 1972, the United Nations Security Council reached
mandos at Tel-Aviv, and for further information on the Lod Airport massacre,
see 18 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, July 15-22, 1972, at 25365-67).
IFALPA called a world-wide one-day strike on June 19, 1972. For some thoughts
engendered by the IFALPA strike of June 19, 1972, see Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What is to be Done, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 819 (1972). For detailed information on the strike, see 18 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, Aug. 5-12, 1972,
at 25408.
'In Council Resolution No. 1 of October, 1970, the Council called upon Contracting States to decide what joint action should be undertaken in accordance
with international law in a case where, for international blackmail purposes, a
State detained, contrary to the principle of Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention,
an aircraft after an unlawful seizure of its passengers or crew or, contrary to the
principles of Articles 7 and 8 of the then draft convention on unlawful seizure
of aircraft (which later became The Hague Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft), failed to extradite or prosecute persons committing acts of unlawful seizure for international blackmail purposes. At the same
time, the Council directed the ICAO Legal Committee, then in session in London,
to consider an international convention or other international instrument to give
effect to the purposes described above, to provide for joint action by States for
taking appropriate measures in other cases of unlawful seizure, and to provide
for amendment of bilateral air transport agreements to remove all doubts concerning the authority to join in taking such action against any State. This was a
far-reaching resolution, and as later discussions in ICAO legal bodies showed, the
good intentions of the resolution foundered on the fear that ICAO might exceed
its mandate by trying to impose sanctions beyond the scope of its powers under
the Chicago Convention, or that ICAO would also exceed its mandate if it caused
to be drafted a Convention which provided for the imposition of sanctions when
sanctions were already contemplated in respect of air matters under Article 41
of the Charter. Hence the insertion in the Council Resolution of June 19, 1972,
of the limiting words "within the ICAO framework."
For the text of Council Resolution No. 1 of October 1, 1970, see ICAO Doc.
No. 8923 - C/998, Action of the Council, 71st Sess., at 55-57; ICAO Doc. No.
8936 - LC/164-2 Legal Committee, 18th Sess., Sept. 29 - Oct. 22, 1970, Vol. II
Documents 179; see 9 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1286-87 (1970).
"Emphasis added. For the text of the Council Resolution of June 19, 1972,
see ICAO Doc. No. 9028- C/1008, Action of the Council, 76th Sess., at 40-41;
see 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 897-98 (1972).
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a consensus decision on hijacking in which it invited "States to
expand and intensify co-operative international efforts and measures in this field, in conformity with Charter obligations, with a
view to ensuring the maximum possible safety and reliability of
international civil aviation."8
These events took place around the time of the one-day IFALPA
world-wide strike held on June 19, 1972.
Other Considerations
Most of the remainder of this paper will be concerned with tracing the evolution of various solutions put forward with respect to
the taking of joint action against defaulting States and related matters. To this end, the paper will examine the discussions in the
Washington Legal Subcommittee (September 1972) urgently convened as a result of the Council decision of June 19, 1972; the
Council decision of November 1, 1972 leading up to the decision
to convene the ICAO Legal Committee in January 1973 and a
decision of November 1, 1972, later changed, to convene a diplomatic conference on aviation security in September 1973; the
Twentieth Session (Special) of the Legal Committee, January 9-30,
1973; the Twentieth Session (Extraordinary) of the Assembly in
August-September 1973 and the international conference on air
law of August-September 1973, both convened pursuant to a Council decision of March 5, 1973.
PART ONE

I. Special Subcommittee on the Council Resolution of June 19,
1972 (Washington, September 4-15, 1972)'
A. New element: "Procedureswithin the ICAO framework"
At the outset the Washington meeting was conscious of the fact
that the Council Resolution of June 19, 1972 imported a new element in that the resolution stated that any solution found must be
one which provided for "procedures . . . within the ICAO framework."'" The words "within the ICAO framework" in effect stated
8 For text, see 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 919 (1972).
8 Much of the material on the following pages is based on: Report of the Special Subcommittee on the Council Resolution of June 19, 1972, ICAO Doc. No.
9050-LC/169-2 [hereinafter cited as LC/SC CR (1972) Report].
1"See note 6 supra.

1974]

CONCERTED ACTION

the desire that ICAO should intervene in some form in the procedures stipulated by the new Convention." Presumably, the intent
was that, in getting into the area of sanctions or anything that resembled them, ICAO should not infringe upon the powers of the
United Nations to impose sanctions in air matters under Article
41 of the Charter."
B. Negative views expressed on the question of joint action

Negative views on the question of joint action were not in short
supply in the Subcommittee. It was submitted to the Subcommittee
that the question of joint action could not be studied apart from
the general subject of State responsibility which was on the agenda

of the International Law Commission." Moreover, it was stated,
nLC/SC CR (1972) Report, 5 13.1.
"This matter had been brought up both during the 18th Session of the Legal
Committee at London in Sept.-Oct. 1970, ICAO Doc. No. 8936-LC/164-2, at 28,
and in the Legal Subcommittee which met in April 1971, see LC/SC CR (1971)
Report at 17-18. See FitzGerald, Concerted Action Against States Found in Default of Their International Obligations in Respect of Unlawful Interference with
International Civil Aviation, 10 CAN. YEARBOOK INT'L L. 261, 269-70 (1972).
In the Statement placed before the Washington Subcommittee in September 1972,
the United Nations Observer examined the question whether the provisions of
Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter about Security Council sanctions are exclusive of all other collective sanctions. In this regard, he pointed out
that in the field of international narcotics control, there had been provision for
a mandatory embargo which might be imposed by the appropriate body either
upon a party or upon a non-party to the relevant treaties. However, the international organ concerned could only recommend an embargo rather than make
a mandatory decision. Mention was also made of the International Labour Organization, as it existed at the time that the General Assembly approved the relationship agreement which made it a specialized agency of the United Nations.
A complaint could be referred to a Committee of Enquiry, which could indicate
"economic sanctions" against the member at fault, which could as a last resort
be applied by the other members. See LC/SC CR (1972) Report, at 91-92.
"In April 1971, the Subcommittee voted on the following question:
Should the study in the ICAO Legal Committee of the subject of
concerted action against a State which has violated its obligations
under international law be completed only after the results are
known of the study of the subject of State responsibility which is
now on the work programme of the International Law Commission
of the United Nations?
(Vote: yes-I, no-7, abstentions-4) (LC/SC CR (1971) Report, at 18.)
For a summary of the extensive work carried out by the United Nations International Law Commission between 1949 and 1970, see U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/245 23 (1971), United Nations General Assembly, International Law
Commission, 23d Sess. (1971), Survey of International Law, at 84-94. See also
Official Records of the General Assembly, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/9010/Rev.
1, Report of the International Law Commission 25th Sess. (1973), Ch. II. A/9334
United Nations General Assembly, Nov. 23, 1973. 28th Sess., Agenda Item 89,
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 25th Sess., Re-
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sanctions were legally admissible only in the case of responsibility
for violation of a specific legal obligation. The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties did not include any rules on responsibility.'
Also the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions should not be
given a preferential position, as compared with other Conventions,
in regard to the question of State responsibility. A further argument
was that universal acceptance of the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal
Conventions would be more beneficial to the world community
than the existence of a convention providing for joint action.
As on earlier occasions," it was also submitted that Article 41
of the United Nations Charter gives exclusive jurisdiction in the
field of sanctions to the Security Council and that it was not possible
to adopt any conventions which would purport to derogate from
that prerogative of the Security Council. Here it was pointed out
that the Security Council decision of June 20, 1972 specifically
stipulated that all efforts and measures must be taken in conformity
with Charter obligations. A contrary view on this point was that
while it was necessary to examine the question of the taking of
joint action against the background of the United Nations Charter,
discussions in the United Nations itself had recognized ICAO's
role in providing for effective measures to stop unlawful seizure and
unlawful interference.'
C. Criteriato be met by any solution adopted
The views expressed in the Subcommittee were that any solution
port of the Sixth Committee, 55 25-58 (pp. 11-17).
UNGA Resolution 3071 (XXVIII)-Report of the International Law Commission recommended that the International Law Commission should continue
on a priority basis at its twenty-sixth session its work on State responsibility, with
a view to the preparation of a first set of draft articles on responsibility of States
for international wrongful acts, and should undertake at an appropriate time a
separate study of the topic of international liability for injurious consequences
arising out of the performance of other activities.
"4Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) reads
as follows:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any
questions that may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of
States or from the international responsibility of a State or from
the outbreak of hostilities between States.
For text of Vienna Convention, see 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 679 (1969).
LC/SC CR (1972) Report, 5 14.2.
16See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 2551 & 2645, G. A.
RES. 2551 (1969) and G. A. RES. 2645 (1970), which recognize respectively
ICAO's roles in the work of finding effective measures to combat hijacking and
unlawful interference with air travel.

1974]

CONCERTED ACTION

that would ultimately be adopted should meet certain criteria. It
should be practical and realistic, if not ideal; preserve air safety;
be universally acceptable; and be in conformity with international
law, including the United Nations Charter and not in conflict with
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, ' the International
Air Services Transit Agreement 8 or bilateral air transport agreements. It should, in so far as the application of measures for joint
action was concerned, be within the ICAO framework.
D. Main trends of discussion
While the Subcommittee's report was lengthy and, in many respects, inconclusive the main trends of its discussions are given
(under the immediately following headings) as indicative of the
earnest attempt to find, by a brain-storming process, solutions for
extraordinarily difficult legal and political problems and as foreshadowing debates which took place at later ICAO meetings on the
question of joint action.
1. The cases in which joint action should be taken
There was general agreement in the Subcommittee that joint action should be undertaken in a first category of cases, i.e., where
a State had detained the aircraft, passengers and crew. On the
other hand, while there was considerable agreement, there was not
unanimity to the effect that there should be provision for joint action in the case of detention of cargo.
As to another category of cases, there was substantial agreement
that there should also be provision for joint action where a State,
having jurisdiction over the act, does not, if the offender or alleged
offender is present in its territory, extradite him, or failing this, does
not submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.'"
A United Kingdom proposal made to a working group of the Subcommittee was that the factor which would trigger the machinery
leading to joint action could be whether the situation arising from
11ICAO

Doc. No. 7300 (1944): 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1948); 9 M.
168 (1950).

HUDSON,

INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION

1

' ICAO Doc. No. 7500; 84 U.N.T.S. 389 (1951); 9 M.
228 (1950).
19LC/SC CR (1972) Report, at 5.
20 Id., 1 18, at 8.

TIONAL LEGISLATION

HUDSON, INTERNA-
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the action or inaction of the State concerned, constituted a threat
to the safety of international civil aviation. The question as to
whether or not there had been such a threat would be determined by
an international body. An opposing view was that the test was not
an objective one but was in fact a subjective one. Moreover, in this
view, the concept was a vague one and so wide as to provide a
temptation for the making of vague allegations against States on
many occasions."
In addition, if the phrase "or that a State has contributed in any
way to a threat to the safety of civil aviation" which, it was suggested, be included in the provisions concerned with the acts or
omissions of States, referred to a principle of the Chicago Convention, then the specific provisions of that Convention should be mentioned. It was further pointed out that the Council had only entrusted the Subcommittee with the task of studying a draft convention in cases of unlawful seizure of aircraft and that while the terms
of reference could possibly be extended to cover the cases of offenses under the Montreal Convention, nevertheless the proposed
instrument should not apply to cases where there was neither an
unlawful seizure of aircraft nor any of the offenses covered by the
Montreal Convention."
2. The States against which joint action should be taken
There was an inconclusive discussion as to the question of the
States against which joint action should be taken. The opposing
views were that, on the one hand, joint action should be taken
against any State and, on the other, against only the States parties
to the new Convention or as the case may be, parties to the Tokyo,
Hague and Montreal Conventions. It emerged from the exchange
of views on this matter that: (a) The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provided as follows: "A treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent."
(Article 34). (b) According to the Chicago Convention, there was
a general obligation that States should not by their acts or omissions
give rise to a threat to the safety of civil aviation. One view in this
regard was that the Chicago Convention referred to safety only in
the technical sense and that the Subcommittee was concerned with
21

Id., 55 5-5.1, at 46-47.

- d., 5 5.3, at 48.
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safety in the penal and political sense." (c) If the new Convention

was to bind or apply to a non-contracting State, it could do so only
if there were certain rules contained in air law conventions which
were considered to be a codification of general principles of international law or international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. One such rule would be that, after the unlaw-

ful seizure of an aircraft, the crew, passengers and aircraft must not
be detained. Another rule would be concerned with the malicious
behavior of the State which gives aid, comfort or encouragement to

the offender. There was no unanimity on these points.

3. The kind of actions that should be considered (determination of default) and the procedure and organization or
agency that would be competent to take the measures "within the framework of ICAO"
Under this heading, the Subcommittee considered points of view
about the proposed fact-finding body" and reached agreement on
231d., 5 26.1, at 13. The question of the meaning of
the word "safety" as
used in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, particularly with respect
to matters involving unlawful interference with civil aviation, has given rise to
discussion in other ICAO circles. This matter was discussed to some extent in
the ICAO Council in March 1973, on the initiative of the Representative of
Japan on the Council. The ICAO Legal Bureau prepared a study, Interpretation
of the Word 'Safety' as Used in the Chicago Convention, C-WP/5732 - 9-3-73,
but expressed no opinion on the matter. However, on March 21, 1973, the President of the Council (C-Min. 78/11 (Open)), announced that the Japanese request had been withdrawn as the Japanese Representative understood that "safety"
included freedom from a deliberate human act of interference of any kind. At
the time, the Representative of Senegal on the Council expressed the opinion
that the words "safety" and "security" were both used in the Chicago Convention
with different meanings. Later, when the adoption of security amendments to
Annexes came up in the Council, the question of the definition of the expression
"security" was raised (C-Min. 80/5, meeting of Dec. 5, 1973. See also, C-Min.
80/18-19-20-21-22, meetings of the Council held during the period Dec. 10-12,
1973).
'LC/SC CR (1972) Report, at 13.
1 See W. SHoRE, FACT-FINDING IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE (1970). This book examines the subject of the investigation of facts as a
contribution to the settlement of international questions. Indeed, ICAO itself engaged in a fact-finding technical investigation into the shooting down of a Libyan
airliner by Israeli aircraft over the Sinai on February 21, 1973. This investigation
was carried out by a team of experts pursuant to instructions given to the Secretary General by the Council at the 4th Meeting of its 78th Session on March 5,
1973. (See also ICAO Ass. Res. A19-1). Subsequent to the submission of the
report of the fact-finding group to the Council, that body, on June 4, 1973
(C-Min. 79/4), strongly condemned Israel's destruction of the Libyan civil aircraft and the loss of 108 lives, and urged Israel to comply with the aims and
objectives of the Chicago Convention.
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the four following items: (a) A Commission should be appointed
in such a manner as to insure the independence of its members. (b)
The Commission should have about nine members. (c) The composition of the Commission could be such as to reflect the three categories specified in Article 50(b) of the Chicago Convention for the
election of Council Members. (d) There could be a large panel from
which the 9-member Commission would be chosen." These matters
were referred to a working group for consideration.
4. The kind of actions that should be considered(recommendation to comply with legal commitments; other measures) and
the procedure and the organ or agency that would be competent to take the measures "within the framework of
ICAO"
In considering the above-mentioned topics which were concerned
with the so-called joint action stage-as distinct from the factfinding stage-the Subcommittee had before it a United States proposal the main element of which was the opportunity given to the
ICAO Council to act directly in respect of joint action.27 The Subcommittee also considered a United Kingdom statement on the joint
action stage whereby it was suggested that once the determination of
default had been made, certain consequences should automatically
follow without a requirement for further decision or action by any
body. Thus, the immediate consequence was that any determination
of default should be that the State concerned should cease to enjoy any privileges under the Chicago Convention," the International
Air Services Transit Agreement" and bilateral air services agreements with States parties to the new instrument. Later, during the
discussion of the joint action stage, a proposal was put forward by
Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United
States of America which, inter alia, contemplated an initial request
to the President of the ICAO Council to use his good offices to aid
in the removal of a threat to the safety of civil aviation and then
went on to allocate a role to a Commission of Experts and provide
for the reaching of a decision on joint action with respect to a State
26

LC/SC CR (1972) Report, 5 31, at 15.
55 53-53.6, at 20-22.

27 Id.,

" See note 17 supra.
20 See note 18 supra.
00 LC/SC CR (1972)
Report, 55 54-54.8, at 22-24.
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determined by the Commission to have contributed to the threat to
the safety of civil aviation."
5. The type of instrument that should be used to accomplish
the aim of taking measures "within the framework of ICAO"
Under this heading, there was general agreement that the solution
of having protocols to the Hague and Montreal Conventions was
the least desirable one. Of the delegations which expressed preferences, a large number were in favour of having a special new Convention, although some of these delegations stated that they were
going to accept the solution of an amendment to the Chicago Convention if this solution proved to be a more practical and a feasible
2
one.1
6. The steps that should be taken to meet the universal desire
that the new instrument should be compatible with general
internationallaw and, in particular,with the Charter of the
United Nations
It was unanimously agreed that any new instrument, such as a
new Convention, should be compatible with general international
law and, in particular, with the Charter of the United Nations. It
was also unanimously agreed that, in accordance with Article 103
of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between
the obligations to the members of the United Nations under the
Charter and their obligations under the proposed new instrument,
their obligations under the Charter should prevail."
There were differences of opinion as to whether the competence
of the Security Council to take collective measures was exclusive
or not and as to whether joint action within the ICAO framework
would be complementary to, or in contradiction with, the competence of the Security Council. Some delegations in the Subcommittee felt that joint action within the ICAO framework would be
in contradiction with the competence of the Security Council,
while others considered that such joint action would be complementary to the competence of the Security Council, especially in
cases where there did not exist "any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or active aggression" within the meaning of Article 39 of
31Id., 55 57-57.7, at 27-28.
32 Id., 55 58-60.1, at 30-31.

33 d., 55 63-63.2, at 32.
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the United Nations Charter and the Security Council could consequently not act. In that case, there would be room for joint action
within the framework of ICAO. Here, it was pointed out that the
Observer from the United Nations had given other examples of
the kinds of complementary action that could be taken. For example, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and the
Convention of 1971 on Psychotropic Substances provided for an
embargo by States against most parties and non-parties in respect
of all substances covered by the Convention."4
The proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to amend
the Hague Convention (1970)
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed that there be a
draft Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague, 1970). This draft contained an
undertaking of each Contracting State "to return offenders to the
State of Registration of the aircraft when so requested by it, except
where the persons concerned are nationals of the State on the territory of which the offender is present."'
Texts available at the conclusion of the meetings of the Special
Subcommittee at Washington
The Special Subcommittee which met at Washington in September, 1972 did not adopt any text of a proposed Convention on
joint action. There were, however, a number of interesting texts
put forward, although not adopted, during the session of the Subcommittee.
a. Text on Scope of Application of the Proposed Convention
Insofar as concerns the scope of application of the proposed
Convention, Annex 1 to a working group's report' contains a text
which, although it did not represent a legal draft, is not without
interest, the text being as follows:
Article 1
Threats to the safety of civil aviation
Whenever a Contracting State which is an interested State has reason to believe that a person has committed any act described in
Iid., 5 63.3, at 32; see full statement of United Nations Observer, at 91-92.
MId.,

11, at 10, 77-78.

"Id., at 58.
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Article 11(1) of the Tokyo Convention, Article 1 of the Hague
Convention or Article 1 of the Montreal Convention and that any
State is detaining within its territory any aircraft involved in such
an act, its passengers, crew or cargo, or has unjustifiably failed to
take such person into custody or take other reasonable measures
to ensure his presence and thereafter to extradite him or submit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,
or that a State has contributed in any other way to a threat to the
safety of civil aviation, it may invoke th provisions of Article ....
This text reflects the kinds of acts that would be contemplated in
provisions pertaining to a Convention concerned with the taking of
joint action against States which would default in their obligations
in the event of the occurrence of such acts.
b. Stage 1 (Fact-finding)
Attached to the supplementary report of a working group of the
Special Subcommittee was a text containing eleven Articles based
on the working group's report and suggested by the Chairman of
the working group, although the text was noted but not discussed
by the working group. The text which was concerned with the first
stage of the procedures, contemplated the existence of an independent Commission of Experts, provided for the election of the members of the Commission and for their general functioning. Under
appropriate circumstances, an interested State that had reason to
believe that a person had committed any act described in paragraph
1 of Article 1 of the Tokyo Convention, Article 1 of the Hague
Convention or Article 1 of the Montreal Convention and had contributed to a threat to the safety of civil aviation by defaulting in
its obligations under the Tokyo, Hague or Montreal Conventions,
could apply to the Commission for a hearing. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the Commission would prepare a report embodying
its findings, describing the facts on which such findings were based
and containing recommendations as to the measures which the
Commission considered necessary to remove any threat which might
exist to the safety of civil aviation."
c. Stage 2 (Joint action)
The draft provisions on Stage 2 (Joint action) were, due to the
somewhat disjointed and hasty working methods of the Special Sub-7

d., at 62-68.
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committee, put forward in the Special Subcommittee itself by the
Delegations of Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America. 8 All that the Subcommittee decided
was that the draft Article prepared by the four States was ready for
presentation to the Legal Committee for its consideration. The
Article presupposed that Stage 1 (Fact-finding) would provide that
the Commission of Experts "shall also make recommendations to
that State (determined to have contributed at any way to a threat
to the safety of civil aviation) as to the action it should take to remove such threat and shall fix a time-limit for that State to act upon
such recommendations." '
The proposed Article on joint action first contemplated that once
a State had been determined to have contributed in any way to a
threat to the safety of civil aviation, and prior to the time-limit fixed
by the Commission of Experts, the complaining State might request
the President of the Council of ICAO to use his good offices to aid
in the removal of such threat.
Failure of the State in default to act upon the recommendations
of the Commission of Experts and remove such threat within the
time-limits fixed by the Commission of Experts would mean that
the rights of such State under the Chicago Convention, under the
International Air Services Transit Agreement, and under bilateral
air services agreements or any other arrangements contemplated by
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention must be suspended in the territories of the States which were parties to the proposed new Convention and would remain suspended until the Commission had determined that the State had acted upon the recommendations of the
Commission of Experts and had removed the threat to the safety of
civil aviation.
The foregoing was an automatic suspension. Further, if the said
State failed to act upon the recommendations of the Commission of
Experts and remove the threat to the safety of civil aviation within
ten days after the time-limit fixed by the Commission of Experts or,
if the determination related to detention of an aircraft, its passengers, crew or cargo, within 72 hours after such time-limit, then the
38 LC/SC CR (1972)

WD/12; see also discussion on the paper in LC/SC

CR (1972) Report, 5 57-57.8, at 26-30.
39LC/SC CR (1972) Report, 5 57.8, at 28. For complete text of the Article
presented by the four States, see LC/SC CR (1972) Report, 5 57.8, at 28-30.
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States which were parties to the proposed new Convention and
which were interested, or air service States, would meet at the request of any one of such States for the purpose of reaching a decision on joint action which they should take with respect to the State
determined by the Commission to have contributed to a threat to
the safety of civil aviation. Such joint action might include any
measures to preserve and promote the safety and security of civil
aviation, including collective suspension of all international air
navigation to and from such State. There were other details in the
provisions which need not be of concern for the purposes of this
note. In any event, it is clear that the four States' draft went very
far along the road to the taking of severe joint action in respect of
a defaulting State.
As will be seen below, when the question of joint action came
before the Legal Committee at its 20th Session (Special) in January,
1973, the procedures envisioned in Stages 1 and 2 were placed before that Session by a number of countries"° as a proposal for the
organization and consolidation of the work of the Committee. It
will also be noted that, as time went on, there was no provision
made as to the taking of joint action even within the framework of
ICAO. The concept of joint action was progressively eroded and,
in the end, nothing at all was adopted on this point.
E. Conclusion
The foregoing represents only a sketchy presentation of some of
the points discussed by the Washington Subcommittee in September 1972." No texts were adopted by the Subcommittee for submission to the Legal Committee. Thus, while the Subcommittee
unanimously agreed that every useful step in order to protect civil
aviation against acts of unlawful sizure of aircraft and acts of unlawful interference should be taken, it considered that, in view of
the differences of opinion in the subcommittee on the question of
the most appropriate means, such an assessment as that contem40 For complete text, see LC/Working Draft No. 820-Proposal on organization and consolidation of the work of the Legal Committee (presented by the
following eight States: Australia, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, the United Kingdom and the United States of America); see also
ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, Legal Committee, 20th Sess. (Special), Jan.
1973, Vol. II-Documents, at 265-73; 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1-8 (1973).
41For a popular presentation of the basic issues at the Washington Meeting,
see Berns, Skyjacking: The Law of the Skies, THE INT'L REV. 49-54 (1972).
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plated above would more appropriately be made by the Legal Committee itself. As will be seen, the Legal Committee itself was unable
to meet this challenge in clear-cut fashion.
II. Action of the Council, November 1, 1972
The Special Subcommittee of the Legal Committee having filed
its report, the then 27-member Council, on November 1, 1972,
after a discussion during which opinions were sharply divided on
the question of dates for meetings, decided, by a vote of 17 to 1
with 8 abstentions, to convene a Special Session of the Legal Committee in January, 1973, in Montreal, to work on the Report of the
Subcommittee and also provided for the convening of a diplomatic
conference on air security in August-September 1973.'
III. Legal Committee-20th Session (Special), January 9-30, 1973
A. Introduction
The 20th Session (Special) of the Legal Committee was held in
Montreal from 9 to 30 January 1973.' It was attended by sixty-five
contracting States of ICAO, one non-contracting State, a United
Nations representative, and five other international organizations.
B. Preliminaryproposal
The Committee had before it at the outset a proposal on organizing and consolidating its work presented by Australia, Canada,
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the United Kingdom and the United States of America."
This proposal was that for the purposes of organizing and consolidating the work of the Legal Committee, the text of certain
articles of a draft convention on air security be taken as a basis of
discussion. The draft articles, many of which had been prepared
during the session of the Washington Subcommittee, but not approved by the Subcommittee, provided for the two-stage procedure
discussed above.
42 ICAO C-Min. 77/4, Pt. I-Decs.
43ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, Legal Committee, 20th Sess. (Special),
Jan. 1973, Vol. I-Minutes, Vol. II-Documents; See 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1-8

(1973).
'See

note 35 supra. The eight States' proposal as found in LC/Working

Draft No. 820 is described in brief form in ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2,
note 38 supra, 5 7, at 17.
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This proposal as briefly described in the Legal Committee's report was as follows: '
(1) In the first stage, a fact-finding Commission of Experts would
determine whether, if a State had detained an aircraft, passengers,
crew and cargo or did not prosecute or extradite the suspected offender, there was a threat to the safety of international civil aviation
and would make recommendations as to what measures should be
taken by the State concerned to remove that threat.
(2) If the measures recommended by the Commission of Experts
were not complied with and the threat to civil aviation was not removed, there would follow the second stage which was concerned
with the taking of joint action. The first phase of the second stage
would involve the use of the good offices of the President of the
ICAO Council. If the threat continued after the time-limit set by
the Commission of Experts, there would be a suspension of the
rights of the State concerned under the Chicago Convention, the
Transit Agreement and bilateral agreements within the meaning of
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention. There was also a provision
for the taking of a decision on joint action by interested States and
such action could include suspension of international air navigation
to and from the State which created the threat to the safety of civil
aviation. As to whether such decision should be binding or recommendatory, the proposal contained three alternatives.
This particular proposal has been described again in some detail because it embodies, in somewhat composite form, a basic approach used by a number of the States which, during the previous
debates on the question of joint action, wished to proceed to a
severe form of sanction against a defaulting State which did not
comply with its obligations under the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal
Conventions.
However, the above-mentioned joint proposal lost ground to four
main proposals which emerged from the somewhat inconclusive discussions held during the 20th Session (Special) of the Legal Committee. The latter proposals-some of which envisaged sanctions
in watered-down form-may now usefully be described since, as will
be seen, these were the main propositions placed before the later
ICAO meetings held on the question of joint action.

I ICAO

Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 38 supra, 5 7, at 17.
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C. Groups of Main Proposals
1. Proposalsconcerned with the Amendment of the
Chicago Convention
a. Draft Protocol of Amendment to the Convention on
InternationalAviation-Presented by France'
The essence of this Protocol was that Articles 1 to 11 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The
Hague, 1970) would be incorporated into the Chicago Convention,
by way of an amendment thereto, and that when the amendment
was adopted, it should be specified, in pursuance of Article 94(b)
of the Chicago Convention, that any State which failed to ratify this
amendment within one year after its coming into force would cease
to be a party to the Chicago Convention. This solution would enable
the ICAO Council to make a decision pursuant to Chapter XVIII of
the Chicago Convention in the case of a disagreement among States
as to the interpretation or application of those provisions of the
Hague Convention which were thus incorporated into the Chicago
Convention. In addition, pursuant to Article 88 of the Chicago
Convention, the ICAO Assembly would, by way of a sanction, have
the right to suspend the voting power in the Assembly or in the
Council of any Contracting State found in default under the new
Chapter in which the provisions of the Hague Convention would
be included.
b. Proposal by the Delegations of Switzerland and the
United Kingdom-Amendments to the Chicago Convention"
A Swiss-United Kingdom proposal consisted of amendments to
the Chicago Convention providing for the insertion of a new Chapter in the Convention entitled "Measures to Protect the Security of
Civil Aviation." The acts contemplated by the amendments were of
the kind already set forth in Article 1 of the Hague Convention of
"For complete text, see LC/Working Draft No. 821-Note Presented by the
French Government on the Report of the Special Subcommittee on the Resolution Adopted by the Council on 19 June 1972; see also ICAO Doc. No. 9050LC/169-2, note 38 supra at 274; for a short description see ICAO Doc. No. 9050-

LC/169-2, 5 8, at 18.
"'For complete text, see LC/Working Draft No. 829 and 2 Addenda; see
also ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 38 supra, at 311; for a short descrip-

tion of this proposal, see ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 38, supra, 55
12-12.5, at 20.
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1970 (Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft) and Article 1 of the Montreal
Convention of 1971 (Unlawful Acts Against Civil Aviation). One
article prescribed the obligations of a Contracting State in whose
territory the alleged offender was present as regards the taking of
the offender into custody, extradition and prosecution. A further
provision was concerned with facilitating the continuation of the
journey of the passengers and crew and with the return of the aircraft and its cargo to the person lawfully entitled to possession. This
provision was in line with similar provisions in the Tokyo, Hague
and Montreal Convention. An additional article in the proposed
new Chapter in the Convention provided that in any case where any
of the acts referred to had been committed, the Council may make
appropriate recommendations to any State whose behavior is involved as to the action which it should take. There were also certain amendments proposed with respect to Articles 86 and 87 to
take care of the case of a Contracting State not acting in conformity
with the provisions of the new Chapter in the Convention. In particular, Article 87 would be so amended as to provide for a sanction
of suspension of air services of a Contracting State which did not
act in conformity with the provisions of the new Chapter. In addition, the Assembly could, as already contemplated by Article 88
of the Chicago Convention, suspend the voting power in the Assembly and the Council of any Contracting State that was found in
default. The subsequent history of this amendment in its various
forms will indicate how the sanction of suspension of air services
was watered down and ultimately disappeared.
2. Proposalsin the form of separate Conventions or Protocols
a. The Nordic draft Convention presented by the Delegations
of Denmark, Finland,Norway and Sweden48
This draft Convention provided that, after there had been an act
of unlawful seizure of an aircraft or of unlawful interference with
an aircraft or air navigation facilities and a State had adopted a
certain position as regards detention (of the aircraft, passengers,
crew or cargo) or as regards custody, extradition or prosecution of
48 For complete text, see LC/Working Draft No. 831 Revised. For a short

description of the original Nordic draft Convention which was presented in
LC/Working Draft No. 831, later revised, see ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2,
note 38, supra, 55 13-13.1, at 20-21.
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the alleged offender, a Contracting State would be entitled to request that the ICAO Council should be convened in order to consider the matter. The proposal involved a fact-finding procedure on
the part of the Council or, in some instances, by a Commission of
Experts, appointed by the Council. A report would be made available to Contracting States, ICAO Member States, and the State
concerned.
If the Council was satisfied that an act of unlawful seizure of aircraft had been committed or there had been an unlawful act against
the safety of civil aviation, and that the State concerned had been
in default, the Council would be obliged to inform the Contracting
States, ICAO Member States and the State concerned about its findings and might recommend that that State take appropriate measures to remedy the situation. If the Council made a recommendation which was not complied with by the State to which it was
addressed, there was a provision for convening, by the Secretary
General of ICAO, of a conference to which all Contracting States
were to be invited along with the State concerned. That conference
might recommend that the State concerned take appropriate measures to remedy the situation. There was also provision for the use of
the good offices of the President of the ICAO Council at certain
stages in the proceedings. It is noted that the emphasis was placed
on the making of recommendations rather than on the imposition of
sanctions.
b. Draft Protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal
on 23 September 1971 (Proposalof USSR)"
The key provision of the Protocols of Amendment to the Hague
and Montreal Conventions presented by the Soviet Union was that
each Contracting State undertook to return offenders to the State
of registration of the aircraft when so requested by it, except where
the persons concerned were nationals of the State in the territory of
which the offender was present. The Protocols would bind only
those States which adopted them and thus would not affect the ob41

LC/Working Draft No. 826; for a short description of this proposal, see

ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 38 supra, 5 10 at 19.
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ligations of those States parties to the Montreal and the Hague Convention which did not become parties to the Protocols.
0
D. Criteriato be met by any solution adopted"
During the general debate in the Legal Committee, the views expressed concerning the criteria to be met by any solution adopted
included the following: it should be universally acceptable; brought
into force at an early date; effective; within the ICAO framework;
in conformity with international law (including the United Nations
Charter, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the International Air Services Transit Agreement and bilateral air transport agreements); and
should not affect the sovereignty of States or entail supplementary
financial expenditures by ICAO. In particular, a number of delegations submitted that, under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, only the United Nations Security Council had competence with
respect to the imposition of sanctions of the kind contemplated by
some of the proposals before the Legal Committee. Other delegations did not share this view. Further, a number of delegations submitted that any attempt to bind non-consenting States by an instrument to which they were not parties was unacceptable.
A number of delegations did not consider that the solution was
to have a new instrument, but rather to secure a greater number of
ratifications of existing conventions. Furthermore, it was submitted,
existing procedures within the United Nations and ICAO could be
utilized. These delegations further pointed out that a new instrument might conflict with and confuse the application of existing
conventions. They also expressed the view that a new Convention,
not in the form of an amendment to the Chicago Convention,
should not involve ICAO's organs as this might affect the smooth
operation of ICAO. In any case, in their view, a new instrument
should have no effects on third parties.

E. Votes on questions of principle"'
These and other proposals having been placed before the Legal
Committee, that body then proceeded to vote, in a highly political
501CAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2 note 38 supra, 55 15-15.1 at 21-22.

11For the full details of the various votes, many of which were roll-call votes,
see ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 38 supra, at 22-31. See also Guillaume,

La Piraterie agrienne et les derniers travaux de I'OACI d ce sujet, 27 Revue
FrancaiseDe Droit A&ien 257-60 (1973).
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atmosphere, on a series of questions of principle in order to determine whether certain bases of work should be eliminated. The Committee decided that an eventual instrument would not contain provisions for the taking of action with respect to States not parties to
the instrument. (Vote: 12 yes, 35 no, 9 abstentions); nor would
the instrument contain provisions for investigating the behavior of
a State not a party to that instrument without the consent of that
State. (Vote: 18 yes, 32 no, 6 abstentions). However, it was decided, by a narrow margin, that the instrument could contain a
provision establishing machinery for making recommendations to
a State whose behavior was involved and was not party to the instrument. (Vote: 24 yes, 21 no, 10 abstentions). However, there would
be no provision for co-ordinating action which might be taken in
conformity with general international law with respect to such a
State. (Vote: 23 yes, 27 no, 6 abstentions)." As to the object of
the eventual instrument, it was decided that the instrument would
not provide for the taking of sanctions with respect to a State
which was not a party to it. (Vote: 18 yes, 30 no, 7 abstentions).
After a lengthy procedural discussion, the Committee decided
that if a new instrument in the form of an amendment to the Chicago
Convention were formulated, that instrument could contain provisions providing for sanctions to be taken against States parties to
that new instrument, by an organ other than those of the United
Nations. (Vote: 29 yes, 19 no, 6 abstentions).
The Committee also decided by the narrow margin of 23 in favor, 19 against and 12 abstentions, that if it decided to formulate
a new instrument in the form of an amendment to the Chicago Convention, that instrument could contain provisions for the taking of
sanctions against States parties to the new instrument in cases other
than those contemplated by the Chicago Convention.
The discussions in the Legal Committee were, to say the least,
highly inconclusive and the numerous roll-votes taken indicated a
sharp cleavage between the opposing camps.
F. Conclusion

Normally, at the end of a session of the Legal Committee, any
draft convention which the Legal Committee considers as ready
52 This, of course, was one of the most contentious items from the very beginning of the whole study of the question of the taking of joint action, namely,
the taking of joint action against a State not party to the instrument concerned.
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for presentation to the States as a final draft is to be transmitted to
the Council, together with a report thereon." Curiously enough, in
spite of the very inconclusive discussions of the Legal Committee
at its 20th Session (Special), the Committee decided-and thus
completely broke with a long-established practice-to recommend
to the ICAO Council:
(1) to submit to an extraordinary session of the Assembly of
ICAO:
(a) the French draft amendment to the Chicago Convention contained in LC/Working Draft No. 821;54
(b) the Swiss-United Kingdom draft amendment to the
Chicago Convention contained in LC/Working Draft
No. 829 and Addenda thereto."
(2) to convene, at the same time and place as the extraordinary
session of the Assembly is held, a diplomatic conference
and to submit to it:
(a) the Nordic draft as revised and contained in LC/Working Draft No. 831 Revised;"
(b) the USSR draft Protocol contained in LC/Working
Draft No. 826.",
By the normal standards followed in the past by the Legal Committee, these could not be considered as final drafts; but the political
situation in the Committee in January, 1973, was such that there
was no hope of giving these drafts the stamp of finality.
Further action on the foregoing and other drafts
On March 5, 1973, the ICAO Council decided to convene the
above-mentioned Assembly and Conference. 8
" ICAO Ass. Res. A7-6; Procedure for approval of draft conventions.
" The French draft amendment is also set forth in A20-WP/2, (Apr. 1973),
published in connection with the Assembly, 20th Sess. (Extraordinary), Rome,
Aug.-Sept., 1973.

" The Swiss-United Kingdom draft amendment is also reproduced in A20WP/3, which contains Addenda Nos. 1 and 2.
5'This document is also reproduced in CAS Doc. No. 4, published in connection with the International Conference on Air Law, Rome, Aug.-Sept. 1973.
" The text of this document as revised is published in CAS Doc. No. 5, Re-

vision No. 2 (Supplementary Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970), while a similar text in relation to
the Montreal Convention is published in CAS Doc. No. 15 revised (Supplementary Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971).
11 C-Min. 78/5.
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The succeeding part of this paper is concerned with the history of
the above-mentioned, and other, drafts placed before the 20th Session (Extraordinary) of the Assembly and the International Conference on Air Law which met at Rome from August 28 to September 21, 1973.
ADDENDUM TO PART ONE

Compatibility of the procedures in the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal
Conventions concerning Settlement of Disputes with the provisions
of a new instrument
The Washington Subcommittee was aware that there could be
a possible lack of compatibility between the procedure of adjudication envisaged in the proposed Convention and the provisions of
the Tokyo, Hague, Montreal and Chicago Conventions which were
concerned with the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of these conventions. 9 Accordingly, the Subcommittee appointed two reporters who suggested alternative lines
of approach as follows:
(a) The facts into which the fact-finding Commission under the
new Convention would enquire should be different from those into
which the International Court of Justice would enquire under the
settlement of disputes Article in any of the three existing Conventions. A possible way of ensuring that would be to reflect the idea
expressed in the Subcommittee of April 1971 about the behaviour
of the defaulting States giving help, protection or encouragement
to the offender, or
(b) The proceedings in the fact-finding Commission should be
suspended if the defaulting State, not a party to the new Convention, invokes the settlement of disputes Article of any of the three
existing Conventions. Nevertheless, if within a specified time-limit
the defaulting State has not submitted the case to the International
Court of Justice, the proceedings shall continue. Once the Court is
seized of the matter, no further proceedings under the new Convention should be taken, or
(c) The new Convention should apply only as between the
Parties to it."0
00

Tokyo: Article 24; Hague: Article 12; Montreal: Article 14.

61 ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 38 supra, 5 14, at 21. For full report

of rapporteurs, see LC/WD No. 824 in ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note
38 supra, at 282-88. The report was presented to the Legal Committee at the
third meeting of its Twentieth Session: ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-1, note
38 supra, at 15.
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When the Swiss-United Kingdom proposal6 was presented to the
20th Session (Special) of the Legal Committee at its 19th Meeting
on January 22, 1973, the United Kingdom Delegate pointed out
that the proposal was intended to eliminate all the legal difficulties
foreshadowed in the commentary of the International Law Association"' and in the report of the reporters appointed by the Special
Subcommittee." Thereafter the report as such does not appear to
have been discussed, although the possible role of the International
Court continued to be discussed in the Legal Committee.
PART

Two

The 20th Session (Extraordinary) of the Assembly
(August 28-September 21, 1973)
A. Introduction
The Assembly, held at Rome from August 28 to September 21,
1973, was attended by delegates from 101 ICAO Contracting States
as well as observers from two non-Contracting States and eight international organizations, including the United Nations. Over 400
delegates and observers were in attendance. "
B. Agenda-Diversion and seizure by Israeli military aircraft of a
Lebanese civil aircraft-ResolutionA20-1
Although the main item on the agenda of the Assembly was consideration of the French draft amendment to the Chicago Convention ' and the Swiss-United Kingdom draft amendment to the ChiLC/WD No. 829; ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 38 supra, at 311.
"1LC/WD No. 823 in ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 38 supra, at
277-81. The comments of the ILA on the Washington report canvassed the various procedures available within the ICAO framework for the taking of joint
action.
63ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-1, note 38 supra, at 141-42.
"Documentation available to the 20th Session (Special) of the Assembly
included: ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-1-2, Legal Committee, 20th Sess. (Special), Jan. 9-30, 1973, Vol. I-Minutes, at 211 and Vol. II-Documents, at (iii),
329, and A20-WP/l to A20-WP/33. In due course, the official volumes of the
minutes and documents of the Assembly will be published.
O LC/Working Draft No. 821; A20-WP/2; ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2,
note 1 supra; 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 378-83 (1973). The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944) is found in the following sources: ICAO
Doc. No. 7300/4; 15 U.N.T.S. 295; 9 M. HuDsoN, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
61

228 (1950).
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cago Convention,' the Assembly devoted its attention at the outset
to the question of the diversion and seizure by Israeli military aircraft of a Lebanese civil aircraft on August 10, 1973. On August
30, the Assembly, following a previous resolution of a condemnatory nature adopted by the Council on August 20,7 in Resolution
A20-1,"' strongly condemned Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and for the forcible diversion and seizure of a Lebanese
civil aircraft, and for violating the Chicago Convention; urgently
called upon Israel to desist from committing acts of unlawful interference with international civil air transport and airports and other
facilities serving such transport; and solemnly warned Israel that if
it continued committing such acts, the Assembly would take further
measures against Israel to protect international civil aviation.
C. Descriptionof main substantive proposals
The substantive proposals which the Assembly had before it are
described in the following paragraphs.
1. Proposal of France
This has already been described above,"9 and it really contemplated a wider acceptance and enforcement of certain provisions
of the Hague Convention of 1970 by incorporating them into the
Chicago Convention and stipulating that States not ratifying the
amendment to the Chicago Convention whereby the Hague provisions would be incorporated into the latter, would, through the
operation of Article 94(b), cease to be a member of ICAO and a
party to the Chicago Convention.
0
2. Swiss-United Kingdom proposal"

As already earlier indicated, the Swiss-United Kingdom proposal
was intended to provide, through an amendment to Article 87 of
the Chicago Convention, that States which did not extradite or
1 LC/Working Draft No. 829 and Addenda; A20-WP/3 and Addenda; ICAO
Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-2, note 1 supra; 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 383-85 (1973).
67A20-WP/l1.
This paper also contains the text of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 337 (1973). For text of ICAO Council resolution,
see also 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1181-82 (1973); for text of Security Council resolution, see also 12 INT'L LEo. MAT. 1280-81 (1973).
" ICAO News Release, Aug. 30, 1973; 28 ICAO BULL. 36-38 (1973).
9 See note 2 supra, and the description in Part One.
70 See note 3 supra, and the description of the Swiss-United Kingdom proposal
in Part One.
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prosecute the alleged offender (e.g., hijacker) or facilitate the journey of passengers, crew, cargo and aircraft would, under appropriate circumstances, be subject to the penalty of suspension of air
services to and from them.
The Delegate of Sudan 1 suggested a redraft of Article 88 in lieu
of Article 87 as amended by the Swiss-United Kingdom proposal.
According to the Sudanese amendment, if the Assembly, on the recommendation of the Council, determined that a contracting State
is not acting in conformity with the provisions of the proposed new
Chapter, it may require, by a two-thirds majority vote, each contracting State to prevent the operation in its territory of aircraft of
the contracting State concerned. Article 88 would provide that the
Assembly, by a two-thirds majority vote, may also suspend the
voting power in the Assembly and in the Council of any contracting
State that is found in default under the provisions of this Chapter.
The approach of Sri Lanka"2 to the Swiss-United Kingdom proposal was that of caution, insofar as sanctions were concerned,
since it would provide that the disputes provisions in Articles 84-88
of the Chicago Convention would have no application to the matters
provided for in the new Chapter which contained substantive articles
taken from the Hague and Montreal Conventions. But the proposal
of Sri Lanka would provide for use of the disputes provisions in
Article 12 of the Hague Convention and Article 14 of the Montreal
Convention by contracting States that had not made reservations
from these Articles as permitted by the respective Conventions."
3. Common elements in the French, Swiss and United Kingdom
proposals
In spite of some basic differences between the French proposal
and the Swiss-United Kingdom proposal, the Assembly had before
it a common expression of views of France, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom to the effect that ICAO was an appropriate forum
for the expression of the views of the international community with
regard to united action against hijacking and sabotage; that an
amendment to the Chicago Convention was the only practicable
way of securing effective application of measures to secure the safety
71A20-WP/16.

" A20-WP/17 Corrigendum.
73A20-WP/4.
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of civil aviation (in this regard, attention was drawn to the existing
Articles 87, 88 and 94(b) of the Convention) and that it was unnecessary for the Assembly to consider, separately, certain of the
provisions before the Committee. In effect, the joint elements contemplated that: (i) each contracting State shall take in its territory,
in accordance with its own law, all appropriate measures to secure
the safety of international civil aviation; (ii) there should be a provision for the continuance of the journey and the return of the aircraft and its cargo in the terms of the provisions found in the Tokyo,"' Hague"5 and Montreal"6 Conventions;" (iii) when two-thirds
of the total number of contracting States to the proposed new convention had become parties to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft signed at The Hague on 16 December
1970, Articles 1 to 11 of that Convention shall form an integral
part of the new Convention;" (iv) when two-thirds of the total number of contracting States to the new Convention have become parties
to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September
1971, Articles 1 to 13 of that Convention should form an integral
part of the new Convention."9
In short, there was a common view to the effect that relevant
provisions of the Hague and Montreal Conventions should be incorporated into the amendment to the Chicago Convention. Items
(ii), (iii) and (iv) formed the basis of key provisions that were
ultimately placed before the Assembly in a series of draft articles
of amendment to the Chicago Convention.
At the same time, the Kingdom of The Netherlands presented a
subamendment to the French-Swiss-United Kingdom common view
and proposed the establishment of a Commission of Experts to work
on the cases under consideration. There was also provision for any
State to apply to the ICAO Council asking for an investigation of
7

4 Art. 11.

Th
76

Art. 9.
Art. 10.

7"This idea formed the basis of Article 70 bis of the new Chapter XVI bis
later placed before the Assembly.
"' This idea formed the basis of Article 70 quinquies of the new Chapter XVI
bis later placed before the Assembly.
" This idea formed the basis of Article 70 sexies of the new Chapter XVI
his later placed before the Assembly.
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such a case." According to these suggestions, there could be a Commission appointed by the Council, in cases where the Council could
not settle the matters through conciliation, and that Commission
would determine whether the facts constituted a failure on the part
of a contracting State to comply with certain obligations. The
Commission was then to communicate its decision to the Council
which should, if appropriate, invite the States concerned to take
all necessary measures to comply with the decision of the Commission. If the State concerned declined to give effect to the decision
within the time-limit fixed by the Council, the latter was bound to
make the decision public. Here again, it may be noted that there
was an attempt to shy away from stiff sanctions and that a great deal
of reliance was placed upon moral persuasion by publicizing delinquency on the part of States.
The Commission also had before it comments from the United
States of America,' the International Air Transport Association
(IATA)," Belgium,' Brazil" and the International Law Association (ILA)."
4. Questions of Principle
After the debate on the foregoing, and other, proposals had proceeded for some time, the President of the Assembly, who was also
acting as the Chairman of the Executive Committee, drew up a series of questions of principle" which are shown below with necessary explanatory annotations along with the votes taken. These
questions were examined from the third to the sixth meetings of the
Executive Committee, held between September 5 and 7.
Question No. 1
"Does the Executive Committee wish that the Assembly, at
"A20-WP/5 and A20-WP/21.
A20-WP/6.
82
A20-WP/7.
83A20-WP/8.
A20-WP/9.
I A20-WP/10. In particular, the ILA paper submitted that ICAO already had
the power under the existing Chicago Convention, to co-ordinate such joint action
as that envisaged under the Council Resolution of June 19, 1972, and suggested
that the Assembly might wish by interpretative resolution or resolutions to spell
out such powers. In this regard, the ILA pointed out that precedents might be
found in the League of Nations Assembly, which more than once adopted resolutions interpreting the League Covenant.
"8A20-WP/14 and Corrigenda.
84
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the time of the possible adoption of an amendment of the Chicago Convention, should apply Article 94(b)?"
This concept which was included in the French proposal would
have the effect of providing that any State which has not ratified
within the specified period after the amendment has come into force
shall thereupon cease to be a member of the Organization and a
party to the Convention.
Vote: This question was rejected by a vote of 11 affirmative
answers, 73 negative answers and 6 abstentions.
Question No. 2
"Does the Executive Committee wish that Article 87 be
amended in accordance with the English-Swiss proposal (see
A20-WP/3, page 5 as amended by page 6)?""
Vote: This question received 42 affirmative votes, 34 negative
votes, with 14 abstentions.
Question No. 3
"Does the Executive Committee wish to include, in the
Chicago Convention, provisions of the Hague and Montreal
Conventions?" 8
Vote: This question received 65 affirmative votes, 4 negative
votes, with 21 abstentions.
Question No. 4
"Does the Executive Committee wish that Article 12 of the
Hague Convention and Article 14 of the Montreal Convention
be also included in the Chicago Convention?
"Note: If the reply to Question No. 4 is in the affirmative, a
decision will have to be taken in regard to the following alternatives:
87See A20-WP/3, at 5 as amended by 6:

Each Contracting State undertakes not to allow the operation of any
airline of Contracting States through the airspace above its territory

if the Council has decided either that the airline concerned is not
conforming to a final decision rendered in accordance with the previous article or that the Contracting State concerned is not acting
in conformity with the provisions of Chapter. . . . (The italicized

words represent the Swiss-United Kingdom additions to Article 87).
effect this was a reference to the common proposal of France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (A20-WP/4, Attachment) to the effect that Arti88 In

cles I to 11 of the Hague Convention and 1 to 13 of the Montreal Convention

be incorporated into the Chicago Convention. (See note 10 supra).
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"As to procedure
(a) Would the procedure for the settlement of differences
concerning the provisions incorporated from the Hague and
Montreal be the ones contemplated in Article 12 of the Hague
and Article 14 of Montreal, and not by the Council of ICAO,
or
(b) Would there be a possibility of choosing between the
two procedures?
"As to sanctions
Would invocation of the procedure in the aforesaid Articles
12 and 14 preclude the application of the penalties provided
by the Chicago Convention?"
The confusion which arose in connection with the foregoing was
that Articles 12 and 14 of the Hague and Montreal Conventions
respectively were already concerned with the settlement of disputes
regarding the interpretation or application of the provisions of those
Conventions, but there was a fear of a possible conflict with the
provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention, which
was also concerned with the settlement of disputes, concerning the
interpretation or application of the provisions of the Chicago Convention which, if amended as agreed by the reply to Question 3,
could include the Hague and Montreal provisions that might be
imported into the Chicago Convention by reference.
Vote: The question was given a negative answer by 10 affirmative votes and 62 negative votes, with 21 abstentions. Since the
negative answer was given to the question, there was no need
for the Executive Committee to make decisions as to the alternatives mentioned above concerning procedure and sanctions.
Question No. 5
"Does the Executive Committee wish to include in the
Chicago Convention provisions concerning acts of unlawful
interference committed by States?"
Vote: The Executive Committee accepted this principle by a
vote of 63 in favour and 6 against, with 22 abstentions.
5. Revised text of proposal of the Delegations of Switzerland and
the United Kingdom-Penalty for non-conformity by States
On the basis of advice received during wide-spread consultations,
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the Delegations of Switzerland and the United Kingdom put forward by September 12 the following text"9 which, in effect, represented a last attempt to include a strong sanction in the amendment
to the Chicago Convention. The text, which took the form of an
amendment to Article 88 of the Chicago Convention read as follows:
Penalty for non-conformity by State

(a) Each Contracting State undertakes not to allow the operation
of the air carriers of a Contracting State through the airspace above
its territory if the Council has decided to this effect. Before taking
such a decision, the Council shall first have decided in accordance
with Article 84 that the Contracting State concerned is not acting
in conformity with the provisions of Chapter ....
(b) The Council may at any time, and taking into account the
prevailing circumstances, suspend, modify or revoke any decision
taken by it under the preceding paragraph.
(c) The Assembly shall suspend the voting power in the Assembly and in the Council of any Contracting State that is found in
default under the provisions of this Chapter other than sub-paragraph (a).
(d) The Council shall determine in what manner the provisions
of this Article shall apply to air carriers which are international
operating agencies.
(e) For the purposes of this Article "air carrier" means a carrier
engaged in the carriage by air of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire on scheduled or non-scheduled services.
At its 10th and 11th meetings, held on September 13 and 15 respectively, the Executive Committee discussed this text, as amended
by suggestions of Sudan"0 and Qatar.' The amendment submitted
by Qatar stipulated that the decision that a Contracting State was
not acting in conformity with its obligations under the Chicago Convention, and that the sanction of suspension of operation of air
carriers should be imposed, would be taken by a two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly and not, as in the case of the SwissUnited Kingdom proposal, by the Council. The Delegate of Qatar
also included in his proposal the right of appeal from the Assembly's decision to the International Court of Justice. At the 1lth
Meeting of the Executive Committee, on September 15, a consider"See also A20-WP/24 which contains numerous explanatory notes.
'OA20-EP/17. The Sudanese text has already been discussed above.
91 A20-WP/25.
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able number of delegations expressed their continued opposition to
a system of collective sanctions against States outside the competence of the Security Council on grounds of both legality and practicality, although it was conceded that the principle of such a system had been approved by the Executive Committee by its reply to
Question No. 2 above. At the same meeting, discussion also ranged
over the practicality of the systems proposed, including whether
decision-making on the subject could be entrusted to the Assembly
which met infrequently; the legal problem of referring appeals to
the International Court of Justice which dealt with disputes between States and not disputes between a State and the organ of an
international body; the question of applying the proposed sanctions
to the States which did not possess airlines; and the position of
multi-national carriers not falling within the definition of international operating agencies.
On September 15, the Executive Committee rejected the latest
Swiss-United Kingdom proposal by a vote of 39 to 25 with 18
abstentions. It rejected the Sudanese proposal by a vote of 51 to
13 with 18 abstentions and rejected the proposal of Qatar by a
vote of 45 to 17 with 20 abstentions.
6. Final steps on the proposed amendment of the Chicago
Convention
a. Executive Committee
Save for what will be stated later, in connection with Article 79
quater, little useful purpose would be served by giving a detailed
history in the Executive Committee of the report which emanated
from the Study Group on drafting charged with preparing the text
on the amendments of the various articles to be included in the
Chicago Convention. Instead, it may merely be observed that these
matters"2 were, in fact, considered at the 12th, 13th and 14th Meetings of the Executive Committee held between September 17 and
18.
b. Plenary Meetings-Proposed new Chapter XVI bis to be
included in the Chicago Convention
The text of the draft articles (as they emerged from the Executive Committee) to be included as an amendment to the Chicago
02As found in A20-WP/28, which contained,
inter alia, a draft of a new
Chapter XVI bis by way of amendment to the Chicago Convention.
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Convention were placed before the Plenary Meetings of the Assembly in the form of a draft resolution entitled "Amendment relating
to inclusion in the Chicago Convention of 1944 of supplementary
provisions to improve the safety of international civil aviation
(Chapter XVI bis)." The Chapter which was to be added to Part

III of the Convention is reproduced in full as it represents the highest level of agreement reached by the Assembly and, as indicated
below, barely failed to be adopted. '
CHAPTER XVI bis
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS TO IMPROVE
THE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
Article 79 bis
When an act of unlawful seizure of an aircraft has been committed or when, due to the commission of an unlawful act against
the safety of civil aviation, a flight has been delayed or interrupted,
any Contracting State in whose territory the aircraft or passengers
or crew are present shall facilitate the continuation of the journey
of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable, and shall without
delay return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession."
Article 79 ter
Each Contracting State shall in accordance with its national law
report to the Council as promptly as possible any relevant information in its possession concerning:
(a) acts of unlawful seizure of an aircraft;
(b) unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation;
(c) the action taken pursuant to Article 79 bis;
(d) the measures taken in relation to the offender or the alleged
offender and, in particular, the results of any extradition proceedings or other legal proceedings."5
s See A20-WP/30, App. A, which includes the proposed Chapter XVI bis
as part of a draft A20 Resolution entitled: Amendment relating to inclusion in
the Chicago Convention of 1944 of supplementary provisions to improve the
safety of international civil aviation (Chapter XVI bis).
" See Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, Article 9 of the Hague Convention
and Article 10 of the Montreal Convention for the basis of the second half of
Article 79 bis.
'" This Article was based on a Canadian proposal in A20-WP/23, which was
essentially the text of Article 11 of the Hague Convention and Article 13 of the
Montreal Convention with certain amendments.
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Article 79 quater
Each Contracting State undertakes to refrain from the use or
threat of force against aircraft, airports or air navigation facilities of
another State subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations and this Convention. This Article shall, in no event, be
interpreted as legitimizing the use or threat of force in violation of
the rules of international law."
Article 79 quinquies

When eighty-six of the Contracting States to this Convention
have become parties to the convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December
1970, Article 1 to 11 of that Convention shall form an integral
part of this Convention, provided that in those Articles references
to "this Convention" shall be construed as references to this Chapter and references to Articles in the said Hague Convention shall be
construed as referring only to such Articles."7
Article 79 sexies
When eighty-six of the Contracting States to this Convention
have become parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal
on 23 September 1971, Articles 1 to 13 of that Convention shall
form an integral part of this Convention, provided that in those
Articles references to "this Convention" shall be construed as
references to this Chapter and references to Articles in the said
Montreal Convention shall be construed as referring only to such
articles."
Article 79 septies
1. The provisions of Articles 79 bis and 79 ter relating to the unlawful seizure of aircraft shall cease to be in force when eighty-six
of the Contracting States to this Convention have become parties
to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970.
2. The provisions of Articles 79 bis and 79 ter relating to unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation shall cease to be in force
when eighty-six of the Contracting States to this Convention have
become parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
"This Article was based, as considerably amended, on a proposal of France,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom in A20-WP/15.
" Based, in modified form, on Article 82 in the attachment to A20-WP/4
(presented by France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
" Based, in modified form, on Article 83 in the attachment to A20-WP/4
(presented by France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
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Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23
September 1971."
These texts were considered during the 9th Plenary Meeting of
the Assembly on September 19 from 1600 to 2200 hours (after
those attending the Assembly had been received by Pope Paul at
Castel Gandolfo) and at the 10th Plenary on September 20-21
from 2030 hours to 0150 hours.
(i) Voting procedure for amendments to draft amendments
Since what was now involved as a question of adoption of an
amendment to the Convention at a Plenary Meeting of the Assembly, the question of voting procedure arose. According to Article
94(a) of the Convention: "Any proposed amendment to this Convention must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly."
On the basis of the attendance at the Assembly (which at the time
of the 9th Plenary Meeting was 100 contracting States) the twothirds required would have been 67."° However, the question arose
as to whether amendments to texts which had emanated from the
Executive Committee could be adopted by a simple majority. During the 9th Plenary Meeting, a special voting procedure was determined whereby amendments to those texts which were not of
a substantive nature could be adopted by a simple majority and
the texts as amended would be required to be adopted by a twothirds majority in the Assembly. 1'
(ii) Votes
No attempt will be made here to examine the voting with respect
to the Preambular Clauses of the Resolution of adoption and there
will merely be recorded the votes on the various provisions of the
amendment. The votes at the 9th Plenary Meeting were as follows:
'The Article contains the necessary machinery for the transition from the
independent Hague and Montreal Conventions to a regime under which the
Hague and Montreal provisions indicated in Article 79 quinquies and Article 70
sexies would be incorporated into the Chicago Convention.

100For determination of attendance at the Assembly for the purpose of a vote
under 94(a) of the Chicago Convention, see Rule 54 of the Standing Rules of

Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization,

ICAO Doc. No. 7600/2,
101Subsequently, the ICAO Council proposed to the 21st Session of the Assembly (Sept.-Oct., 1974) that Rule 54 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of

the Assembly (ICAO Doc. No. 7600/2) be amended so as to embody this voting
procedure.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Chapter XVI bis (Title) adopted 21-20-35
Article 79 bis adopted 82-0-12
Article 79 ter adopted 78-1-14
Article 79 quater rejected 65-0-29, (the required majority
of 67 not being attained)
(5) Article 79 quinquies rejected 62-1-23. (Just prior to this
vote a United States proposal to substitute "forty" for
"eighty-six" was rejected by a vote of 41 to 28 with 19
abstentions)
(6) Article 79 sexies rejected 57-2-35
(7) Article 79 septies not put to vote
The vote on Article 79 quater was the crucial one and, this being so, an examination of its abortive legislative history at the Assembly will now be in order.
(iii) Article 79 quater-Inclusion in the Chicago Convention of
provisions to cover unlawful acts of interference committed by
States
The Assembly had before it, in connection with the proposed
amendment of the Chicago Convention, the new and difficult question of the possible inclusion in the Convention of provisions to
cover acts of unlawful interference committed by States, and this
was reflected in Article 79 quater which came before the Plenary
Meeting during the last days of the Assembly. The legislative history of Article 79 quater follows.
When, on August 20, 1973, the Council condemned the Israeli
diversion of a Lebanese civil aircraft on August 10, it also recommended "to the Assembly at its 20th Session (Extraordinary) that
it include in its agenda consideration of these actions [by States] in
violation of the Chicago Convention and take measures to safeguard international civil aviation." As a result, the Assembly included in its agenda an item entitled: "Consideration of inclusion
in the Chicago Convention of provisions concerning acts of unlawful interference committed by States." Subsequently, France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom proposed the following Article
on this topic for inclusion in an amendment to the Chicago Convention:
Subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, of
this Convention and of any agreement between the States concern-
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ed, each Contracting State undertakes not to interfere by force or
threat of force"°' with an aircraft of another State. Nothing in this
Article shall be taken to authorize the use of force or threat of
force in any circumstances in breach of the rules of international
law."0
It so transpired that the concept embodied in this provision was the
object of the most crucial vote in the whole Assembly.
The Executive Committee approved this text at its 1 lth meeting,
on September 15, by a vote of 46 to none with 36 abstentions. This
text, as considerably modified by the Executive Committee's Study
Group (Drafting) so as to include in the first sentence a reference
not only to "aircraft" but also to "airports or air navigation facilities" of another State, appeared as Article 79 quater in the text of
a new Chapter XVI bis placed before the Executive Committee."'
At the 14th Meeting of the Executive Committee, on September
18, the Egyptian Delegation proposed a text in lieu of that prepared by the Study Group (Drafting) which, it was stated, involved
no change of substance but merely improvements or drafting, this
text being as follows:
Each Contracting State undertakes to refrain from the use or threat
of force.. against civil aircraft, airports, and air navigation facilities and services of another State, subject to the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations under this Convention. This Article
shall, in no event, be interpreted as legitimizing the use or threat
of force in violation of the rules of international law.'"
On the roll-call vote, the Egyptian text which represented a marked
gesture of compromise was adopted by a vote of 52 in favour, without opposition, but with 21 abstentions. It was essentially this text,
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 5 4 contains the words "threat or use of force" thus:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or integrity or
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. (emphasis
added).
102A20-WP/15.
4 A20-WP/28.
102The Egyptian text, while not repeating the expression "force or threat of
force" found in the French-Swiss-United Kingdom and original wording (A20WP/15), continued to use the expression "use or threat of force" found in Article
79 quater as placed before the Executive Committee.
" This is in the form put forward by the Egyptian Delegation at, and adopted
by, the 14th Meeting of the Executive Committee for transmission to the Plenary.
'0
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with the omission of the word "civil" in the first sentence, which was
placed before the Plenary Meeting and it was the failure of this text
to be accepted by a vote which was 2 votes short of the required
two-thirds majority of the Assembly which was the main cause of
the failure of the Assembly.
Since the failure of the 9th Plenary Meeting, by a narrow margin
of two votes, to adopt Article 79 quater had apparently wrecked
the possibility of adoption of the whole package of amendments
found in the proposed new Chapter XVI bis, it is not surprising
that, at the 10th Plenary Meeting on September 20, the debate was
reopened, on the proposal of Qatar, by a vote of 60 to 7 with 24
abstentions.
The Delegate of Colombia, on behalf of seven states (Colombia,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela) proposed the following text, in which the word "civil" was
reinstated at the request of Qatar:
Each contracting State undertakes to refrain from the use or threat
of force and from permitting the use or threat of force against civil
aircraft, airports or air navigation facilities of another State, subject
to the provisions and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and this Convention. This Article shall not be interpreted
as authorizing,' in any circumstances, the use or threat of force
in violation of the rules of international law.
This text, being considered as an amendment to the original text of
Article 79 quater as submitted to the Assembly was made subject
only to the simple-majority vote agreement mentioned earlier and
was accepted by 33 votes to 20, with 39 abstentions. But when put
to vote under the two-thirds rule contained in Article 94(a) of the
Chicago Convention, it was rejected by 39 votes in favour, 20
against and 33 abstentions."'
The question of Article 79 quater was again reopened and the
French Delegation then proposed adoption of Article 79 quater as
it had been originally submitted to the Plenary by the Executive
Committee with the inclusion of the word "civil" in front of the
word "aircraft" and the words "and principles" after the word "proIt may be noted, in particular, that the word "authorizing" was used instead of the word "legitimizing" found in the text that was so narrowly defeated
at the previous Plenary Meeting.
101
This vote of 39 in favour, 20 against and 33 abstentions was a remarkable
drop from the previous vote of 65 in favour, 0 against and 25 abstentions.
107
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visions." The Delegate of Tanzania proposed an amendment to the
French proposal by the addition of the words "and from permitting
the use or threat of force" in the second line. This was considered by
the Assembly to be an alternative to the French proposal.
The French proposal was then voted upon and rejected by 52
votes in favour, 2 against, with 35 abstentions as it had not received
the required two-thirds majority."' The Tanzanian proposal was rejected by 37 votes in favour, 18 against, and 34 abstentions.
Articles 79 quinquies and 79 sexies were rejected by a vote of 43
in favour, 2 against with 44 abstentions. As a consequence Article
79 septies was also rejected.
The Delegate of France then moved a vote on Article 79 bis
and 79 ter, these provisions representing what remained of the proposed Chapter XVI bis. The articles, which on the previous day had
received such a high favorable vote, were this time rejected by a
vote of 54 in favour, none against and 34 abstentions, the vote failing to obtain the required two-thirds majority.11 Thus, the whole of
Chapter XVI bis was rejected.
7. Conclusion
a. Reasons for failure of Assembly
the
long
and chequered history of the attempt to import
So ended
into the Chicago Convention the provisions of the Hague and Montreal Conventions; with the intention of imposing on States that did
not comply with the provisions so incorporated the sanctions available under the Chicago Convention. The crucial vote in the whole
exercise was that with respect to Article 79 quater, on the evening
of September 19, when 67 votes would have brought about the
adoption of that key provision and only 65 were obtained. In this
regard one cannot help but think of the failure of the second session
of the Law of Sea Conference in 1960 when the proposal for the
expansion of territorial waters failed because, 55 votes being required for its adoption, only 54 were forthcoming.1"
A further and more basic reason for the failure of the Assembly
"0 A20-WP/30.
110 On the previous day Article 79 bis had received 82 affirmative votes and

Article 70 ter 78 affirmative votes.
"I Second U.N. Conf. on Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 19/8 (1960)

at 30.
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was, of course, a lack of consensus among the various interested
parties. A number of developing countries were, for their own reasons, opposed to having any provisions which would involve application of sanctions. The Socialist countries were not interested in
amending the Chicago Convention but were interested rather (see,
in this regard, the description of the diplomatic conference below)
in strengthening the extradition provisions found in the Hague and
Montreal Conventions. Only an exhaustive analysis of the roll-call
votes-of which there were many-both at the 20th Session (Special) of the ICAO Legal Committee (January 1973) and at the
20th Session (Extraordinary) of the Assembly and the International Conference on Air Law (Rome, 28 1August-21
September 1973)
12
would give the complete political story.

b. Resolution A20-2
All that the Assembly was able to do was to adopt Resolution
A20-2 which, in referring to acts of unlawful interference with civil
aviation, condemned all such acts and any failure by a Contracting
State to fulfill its obligation to return an aircraft which is being
illegally detained or to extradite or to submit to the prosecuting
authorities the case of any person accused of an act or unlawful
interference with civil aviation; appealed to States to become parties
to the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions if they had not
already done so, and reaffirmed ICAO's important role to facilitate
the resolution of questions which may arise between Contracting
States in relation to matters affecting the safe and orderly operation
of civil aviation throughout the world.

"' For convenience, some of the more important roll-call votes taken on
Article 79 quater at the 9th and 10th Plenary Meetings are given in the Appendix
to Part Two.
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APPENDIX TO PART TWO

Votes on some of the crucial phases of the legislative

history of Article 79 quater

States

Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Central Afr. Rep.
Chile
Colombia
Congo (PR)
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslovak SR
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt (A.R.)
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany (F.R.)
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica

(1)
(2)
Art. 79 quater Reopening of
received from Art. 79 quater
Executive Com. 10th Plenary
9th Plenary

(3)
Latin Am.
proposal
10th Plenary

(4)
French
proposal
10th Plenary

Yes No Abs Yes No Abs Yes No Abs Yes No Abs
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
X
X
x
x
X
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x
x
X
x
x

x
X
x
X

x
x
x
x
x
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States

(1)
(2)
Art. 79 quater Reopening of
received from Art. 79 quater
Executive Com. 10th Plenary
9th Plenary

(3)
Latin Am.
proposal
10th Plenary

(4)
French
proposal
10th Plenary

Yes No Abs Yes No Abs Yes No Abs Yes No Abs

Japan
Jordan (H.K.)
Kenya
Korea (Rep.)
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libyan A.R.
Luxembourg
Malagasy Rep.
Mali
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands (K)
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Spain
Sri Lanka (R)
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian A.R.
Ianzania (U.R.)
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Union of SSR
United Arab
Emirates
United Kingdom
United States

x

x

X
x

x

X
x
X

x
x
x
x

X
x

X

X
X
X

X

x

X

X

X
X

x

X

X

X

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

X

X

X

X

X

X
x

x

X

X

x

X
x

X

x

x

x

X
X

x

x
x
x

X
X

X

x
x

X
X
X

x

x
x

X

x
X
X

x
x
x
x

x
X
x
X
X

X X

x
x
x
x

X
x
X
X
x

X

X
X

X
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x

X
X

x
X

x

x
X

X

X
X
X

X

x

X

x
X

x
x

x
X

X
x

x
X
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PART THREE

International Conference on Air Law
(Rome, August 28-September 21, 1973)
A. Introduction
The International Conference on Air Law11' was convened by the
Council of ICAO, pursuant to the procedure prescribed in Assembly Resolution A7-6, for the purpose of considering the Nordic
draft Convention,11 ' as well as the draft Protocols of the Soviet
Union already mentioned.1 ' The Conference was held, in Rome,
on the premises of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), from August 28 to September 21, 1973.
The Governments of 101 States (5 of which were non-Contracting) were represented at the Conference. Eight international organizations-among them the United Nations-were represented by
observers. The Conference was attended by over 400 representatives
"' Documentation available to the International Conference on Air Law included: ICAO Doc. No. 9050-LC/169-1-2 Legal Committee, 20th Sess. (Special),
Jan. 9-30, 1973, Vol. I-Minutes, at 211, and Vol. II-Documents, at (iii), 329,
and CAS Doc. Nos. 1-29, as well as an unnumbered document containing final
draft protocols placed before Plenary Meetings of the Conference in its closing
days. In due course, the official volumes of the minutes and documents of the
Assembly will be published.
114CAS Doc. No. 4; LC/Working Draft No. 831 Revised; 12 INT'L LEG. MAT.
387-89 (1973).
113CAS Doc. No. 5 Revision No. 2 and CAS Doc. No. 15 Revised. See also
LC/Working Draft No. 826 which is reproduced in 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 390-91
(1973), this being the unrevised version of CAS Doc. No. 5.
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and observers. The President of the ICAO Council opened the
Conference.
B. Agenda
Initially, the substantive items on the Agenda of the Conference
included the draft Convention and the draft Protocols to which
reference has already been made. However, the Conference decided
to include in its Agenda also consideration of (a) a draft Convention on the Security of International Civil Aviation presented by
Belgium"' and (b) a draft Supplementary Protocol presented by
Greece, to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971.11
On August 20, 1973, the Council (Extraordinary Session, 1st
Meeting) recommended to the Conference that it make provision
"inthe Conventions" for acts of unlawful interference committed
by States."' Accordingly, at its First Plenary Meeting, the Conference added to its Agenda an item entitled "Inclusion in the Conventions of provisions concerning acts of unlawful interference committed by States."
C. Results of the Conference
None of the draft Protocols presented for consideration by the
Conference obtained the required majority when presented for final
vote. No draft convention was presented for a vote. Consequently,
the Conference terminated without having adopted any instrument
other than a Final Act."' The Final Act was opened for signature
on September 21, 1973 and was signed on behalf of 82 States. The
original copy of the Final Act has been deposited with ICAO. However, in spite of the failure of the Conference, an examination of
the main proposals placed before it indicates a high degree of agreement about the measures that could be taken against unlawful interference with international civil aviation, including the elimination
of safe havens for malefactors.
116 CAS Doc. No. 12.
117

CAS Doc. No. 16.

"'CAS Doc. No. 14.
"' Final Act of the International Conference on Air Law held under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Rome, Aug. 28-Sept. 21,
1973. See also 28 ICAO BULL. 36-38 (1973).
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D. Basic documents before the Conference
The basic documents before the Conference fell into two categories:
1. Proposalsfor a new Convention
a. The Nordic draft Convention proposed by the Delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 2 '
b. A draft Convention on the security of international civil
aviation as first suggested and later proposed by Belgium. 2 1
2. Proposalsfor strengthening existing instruments
a. Supplementary Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft signed at The
Hague on December 16, 1970, presented by the Delegation of the USSR. 2'
b. Supplementary Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971,
presented by the Delegation of the USSR.'"
c. Draft Supplementary Protocol to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971,
presented by the Delegation of Greece.'"
E. Discussion of proposals for a new Convention
1. Nordic Proposal
The Nordic proposal has already been described above."
2. Belgian Proposal
According to the Belgian proposal," the draft Convention would
assign to an independent Commission the task of ensuring that
States parties to the new Convention fulfill all obligations under
international law in the field of aviation security. The Commission
might furthermore recommend to States that were parties to the
"' CAS Doc. No. 4.
121CAS Doc. No. 12.
"'

CAS Doc. No. 5, Revision No. 2.

CAS Doc. No. 15 Revised.
14 CAS Doc. No. 16.
"'

12
128

See Part Two, Section III, I.B. (1).
CAS Doc. No. 12.
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Convention (and only to those States), the application of safeguarding measures, i.e., preventive measures and measures for preservation or protection, to the exclusion of penal or coercive measures, if it considered that the safety of international civil aviation
was jeopardized. Aware of the objections raised to the assignment
of new responsibilities to the ICAO Council, the Belgian Government stated that it preferred the more flexible formula of an independent Convention, capable, outside any public confrontation, of
enabling action to be taken with the speed required by circumstances. The Government resolutely rejected the idea of a system
of sanctions, even with regard to States parties to the Convention.
Rather than employing measures likely to give rise to tension in
the field of international air transport, the Belgian draft proposed
assistance based on the free acceptance of collective discipline. If a
large number of States so wished, a provision for recommendations
to non-party States could be included in the Convention.
3. Votes on questions of principle
The two foregoing draft Conventions were debated together in
the Commission of the Whole and gave rise to a number of questions of principle which were extensively discussed and then voted
upon. The results of the votes on questions of principle, taken at
the 9th, 10th and 12th meetings of the Commission of the Whole,
between 12 and 14 September, were as follows:
Question 1(a)..'
A new Convention should apply in respect of State conduct
with regard to acts or omissions referred to in the Hague and
Montreal Conventions. (58 in favour, 2 against, with 31 abstentions)
Question 1(b)
The Commission rejected the question of principle "Should a
new Convention cover also other State conduct which constitutes a threat to the safety of international civil aviation?" (20
to 15, with 57 abstentions)
Question 2
The Commission agreed that the new Convention should apply
when acts of unlawful interference have been committed by
States. (44 to 4, with 44 abstentions)
1'7 For the texts of Questions l(a) to 3, see CAS Doc. No. 21.
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Question 3(a)
The Commission rejected by a vote of 68 to 7, with 15 abstentions, the preference for a machinery under the new Convention to utilize a body outside the ICAO framework.
Question 3(b)
It agreed, by a vote of 35 to 29, with 26 abstentions to express
a preference for machinery under the new Convention to utilize one or more bodies within the ICAO framework.
Question 3(c)
It also agreed, by a vote of 37 to 27, with 26 abstentions, to
express a preference for a machinery under the new Convention to utilize the framework of ICAO in conjunction with an
outside body.
Question 4(a)"'
The Commission rejected, by a vote of 33 to 30, with 22 abstentions, the concept that the outside body referred to in question 3 (c) should include a Commission of independent persons
which would submit a report to an organ within the framework
of ICAO.
Question 4(b)
The Commission decided, by a vote of 42 to 14, with 30 abstentions, that the outside body referred to in question 3(c)
should include a Conference of States as provided in Article 5
of CAS Doc No. 4 (the Nordic proposal).
Question 5
In view of the vote on Question 4(a), there was no vote on
Question 5: "Should the Commission of independent persons
described in question 4(a) be competent:
(a) Only to determine facts falling within the scope of the
Convention, or
(b) To assess State conduct with regard to facts falling within
the scope of the Convention?"
Question 6(a)
Should the machinery established under the new Convention
be competent to make recommendations to a State party to the
Convention alleged to be in default?: Yes 58, no 8, abstentions
18.
125

For the texts of Questions 4(d) to 7, see CAS Doc. No. 25.
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Question 6(b)

Should the machinery established under the new Convention
be competent to make recommendations to a State party to the
new Convention not alleged to be in default?: Yes 37, no 33,
abstentions 16.
Question 6(c)

Should the machinery established under the new Convention
be competent to make recommendations to a State party to
the Chicago Convention?: Yes 30, no 40, abstentions 13.
Question 6(d)

Should the machinery established under the new Convention
be competent to make recommendations to any other State?:
Yes 22, no 47, abstentions 12.
Question 7

Should the new Convention be terminated upon the entry into
force of corresponding amendments to the Chicago Convention? (Vote deferred until contents of new Convention, if any,
were known).
Special question

A special question put to the Commission of the Whole was the
following: Should the new Convention, if any, envisage the use
of one or more ICAO bodies without amending the Chicago
Convention? The result of the vote was 44 in favour, 26
against with 17 abstentions. As to this last question, the Commission was informed by the Director of the ICAO Legal Bureau, at the 10th Meeting on September 12, that there was
nothing in the Chicago Convention to prevent the assignment
of certain functions to the ICAO Council in a new Convention, provided they were not mandatory functions. He cited Article 55 (e) of the Chicago Convention (which gives the Council an investigative capacity) and recalled that the Council had
accepted the functions conferred upon it by the Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties
on the Surface (1952) and by the North Atlantic Joint Financing Agreements and in its Resolutions of April 10, 1969,
and June 19, 1972, had shown a predisposition to accept certain functions in connection with the prevention of acts of unlawful interference.
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4. Overall results of votes on questions of principle
In spite of all of the foregoing votes on questions of principle,
no text, whether based on the Nordic proposal or the Belgian proposal emerged from the Study Group (Drafting) charged with preparing texts of draft conventions for submission to the Commission. " ' As a result no text of a separate convention was placed before a Plenary Session of the Conference for adoption.
5. Fate of the Nordic proposal
At the 18th Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, on September 20, statements were made by several Delegations expressing
regrets that the Study Group (Drafting) had been unable, for a lack
of time, to examine the questions of principle which had been
formulated in connection with the Nordic proposal.' It was argued
that as long as the Nordic Delegation maintained their proposal,
it was up to the Commission of the Whole to refer it back to the
Study Group (Drafting) or to refer it to the Plenary. After the
Delegate of Sweden had explained that some of the essential elements in the Nordic draft had been unacceptable to a majority in
the Conference, and that in those circumstances the text prepared
by the Study Group (Drafting) would no longer be identical with
the Nordic proposal, it was noted that no further action was called
for on the part of the Commission.
F. Proposals for strengthening existing instruments
As indicated earlier, these proposals took the form of the draft
Protocols of Amendment respectively to the Hague Convention..
and Montreal Convention put forward by the USSR and a draft
Protocol of Amendment to the Montreal Convention put forward
by the Delegation of Greece." 2 These proposals will now be discussed.
1. Proposals of the Soviet Union
For convenience both proposals of the Soviet Union may be discussed together.
...
See, however, a text put forward by the Austrian Delegation: Draft Convention on the Security of International Civil Aviation, CAS Doc. No. 20. This
text was not put to vote.
130 CAS Doc. No. 4.
1C1GAS Doc. No. 5, Revision No. 2 and CAS Doc. No. 15 Revised.
132CAS Doc. No. 16.
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The basic proposal as regards the amendment of the Hague Convention was to replace Article 8, paragraph 2 of that Convention"
by the following provisions:
2. Each Contracting State undertakes to return offenders to the
State of registration of the aircraft or to the State referred to in
Article 4, paragraph 1(c)of the Convention when so requested by
it, except where the persons concerned are nationals of the State on
the territory of which the offender is present. Extradition shall be
subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested
State.
"If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it
shall consider this Convention as an extradition treaty in respect of
the offense."
M

As far as it concerned the amendment of the Montreal Convention,
the proposal was to replace Article 8, paragraph 2 of that Convention by similar provisions.
a. Miscellaneous proposals
(i) Bulgaria
At the same time, the Commission also had before it a proposal,
at first circulated informally at the 7th Meeting of the Commission
of the Whole on September 10, and later sponsored by Bulgaria,'"
to replace Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Hague and Montreal Conventions by the following:
(2)
(a) Each Contracting State undertakes, subject to the provisions of its national law and its practice, to give preference to the extradition of alleged offenders present in that
"' Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Hague and Montreal Conventions reads as
follows:
Article 8

2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty,
it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for
extradition in respect of the offences. Extradition shall be subject
to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
134CAS Doc. No. 5, Revision No. 2. CAS Doc. No. 15 Revised. The remainder of the text is the same as that of Article 8(2) of the Hague Convention.
"8

CAS Doc. No. 24.
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State, upon receipt of a request to extradite, to the State
of registration of the aircraft or to any other Contracting
State entitled to request extradition. The provision shall
not apply when the alleged offender is a national of the
State in the territory of which he is present.
(b) If a Contracting State, which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty, receives a request for
extradition from another Contracting State with which it
has no extradition treaty, this Convention shall be the
legal basis for extradition in respect of the offense.
(c) The provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
paragraph shall not affect obligations of Contracting
States under any extradition treaty.
No vote was taken on this proposal.
(ii) Netherlands
At the 7th Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, on September 10, the Netherlands put forward a redraft which differed from
the Soviet text in four main respects: (i) in it, a Contracting State
undertook to give preference to the extradition of (rather than to
extradite) alleged offenders present in its territory: (ii) as between
States requesting extradition it gave preference to the State of registration of the aircraft "or to any other Contracting State entitled to
request extradition" (instead of giving specific preference, in the
second alternative, to the operating State if the aircraft was leased);
(iii) it made the Hague and Montreal Conventions "the legal basis
for extradition in respect of the offense" if a Contracting State
which made extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty received a request for extradition from another Contracting State with
which it had no extradition treaty (instead of stating, as did the
USSR provision, that each Convention would be considered as "an
extradition treaty in respect of the offence"); and (iv) it added the
stipulation that the provisions of the Article would not affect the
obligations of Contracting States under any extradition treaty.
This proposal was not adopted.
(iii) Nicaragua
There was also an unadopted proposal"' which provided that the
first sentence of the proposed new Article 8, paragraph 2 of the
Hague and Montreal Conventions should read in part as follows:
2. Each Contracting State undertakes to return to the State of
CAS Doc. No. 18.
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Registration of the aircraft or to the State referred to in paragraph... offenders who for all the legal effects of the penal action
committed shall be considered as common offenders ...
b. Main points raised in the discussion of the Commission of the
Whole
After there had been considerable discussion in the Commission
of the Whole with regard to these proposals which were aimed at
strengthening the extradition provisions of the Hague and Montreal
Conventions, the Chairman put forward the following resum6 of
of points raised with respect to them, these being amended somewhat in the light of further discussion in the Commission of the
Whole. "'
(i) The introduction of a principle of preference in favor of
extradition over prosecution by the authorities of the requested
State, it being understood that this principle would leave intact the
possibility of application of the national law of the requested State,
both as regards procedure and substance, with respect to the decision concerning the extradition requested.
(ii) Establishment, through the Convention, of an extradition
treaty concerning offences provided for by the Hague and Montreal
Conventions as between Contracting States which have not concluded extradition treaties between them.
(iii) Priority, in case of concurrent requests for extradition, in
favor of the State of registration of the aircraft or the State referred
to in Article 4, paragraph 1 (c), of the Hague Convention. 8 and
Article 5, paragraph 1 (d) of the Montreal Convention."'
At the 8th Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, on September 10, the Commission, on considering the first of the abovementioned points accepted, by a vote of 25 to 21, with 39 abstentions, the principle of preference of extradition over prosecution by
the authorities of the requested State, it being understood that this
principle would leave intact the possibility of application of the
national law of the requested State both as regards procedure and
substance, with respect to the decision concerning the extradition
requested.
The second point presented by the Chairman was modified at
CAS Doc. No. 19.
18 The State of the lessee of an aircraft leased without crew.
'3 The State of the lessee of an aircraft leased without crew.
1"7
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the 1 lth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole on September 14,
to read:
Should the new instrument between the contracting parties replace
in Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Hague and Montreal Conventions
the words "may at its option" by the word "shall"?
An affirmative answer to this question, as amended, was given by a
vote of 31 to 14, with 38 abstentions. This marked a dramatic shift
away from the compromise proposal based on the optional compromise formula included in the Hague and Montreal Conventions.'40
A further question of principle reading as follows:
For all purposes, including extradition, should the acts foreseen
in the Hague and Montreal Conventions be considered as common
offences?
was rejected by a vote of 10 in favor, 36 against with 43 abstentions.
The Soviet draft Protocols were referred to a Study Group
(Drafting) and were reported out to and discussed in the Commission of the Whole. As reported out from the Commission of the
Whole, the basic texts were as follows:11
c. Protocol to Amend the Hague Convention in the Plenary Meetings of the Conference
Article I
The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention
shall be deleted and replaced by the following:
2. (a) Each Contracting State undertakes to give preference to the
extradition of an alleged offender requested by the State of registration of the aircraft or by any other Contracting State entitled
to request extradition, over the submission of the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. This provision shall not apply when the alleged offender is a national of
the requested State.
(b) If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional
140 For the evolution of the optional formula which was the last minute compromise that enabled Article 8(2) to be adopted at the Hague Conference of
1970, see FitzGerald, Toward Legal Suppression of Acts Against Civil Aviation,
585 INT'L CONCILIATION 42, 62-63 (1971).
141 See CAS Doc. No. 26 for amendments to the Hague Convention, and
CAS Doc. No. 27 for amendments to the Montreal Convention.
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on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition
from another Contracting State with which it has no extradition
treaty, it shall consider this Convention as the legal basis for
extradition in respect of the offence.
(c) The decision concerning the extradition shall, both as to
procedure and substance, be subject to the national law and
practice of the requested State.
(d) The provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall not affect obligations of Contracting States under
any extradition treaty.
d. Protocol to amend the Montreal Convention in the Plenary
Meetings of the Conference
Article I
The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention
shall be deleted and replaced by the following:
2. (a) Each Contracting State undertakes to give preference to the
extradition of an alleged offender requested by the State of registration of the aircraft or by any other Contracting State entitled
to request extradition, over the submission of the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. This provision shall not apply when the alleged offender is a national of
the requested State.
(b) If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional
on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition
from another Contracting State with which it has no extradition
treaty, it shall consider this Convention as the legal basis for
extradition in respect to the offence.
(c) The decision concerning the extradition shall, both as to
procedure and substance, be subject to the national law and
practice of the requested State.
(d) The provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall not affect obligations of Contracting States under
any extradition treaty.
e. Voting rule applied
Here it may be recalled that the 1st Plenary Meeting, on August
28, decided, on the proposal of France, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom, that the voting rule established for the Plenary meetings
at the Conference be as follows:
Rule 20 bis
Any draft convention shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority
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of the total number of States represented at the Conference. The
provisions of this rule shall prevail over those of Rule 20.
At the 9th Plenary Meeting, on September 21, this rule was suspended, on a proposal of the Delegation of the Soviet Union by a
vote of 40 to 32, with 12 abstentions. This meant that the Rule in
Article 20(1 ) applied, namely that:
Decisions of the conference and all matters of substance shall be
taken by a two-thirds majority of representatives present and voting.
f. Vote on the Supplementary Protocol to Amend the Hague Convention
The vote then took place on the key Article I of the Supplementary Protocol to Amend the Hague Convention and, with 46
votes in favor, 25 against and 18 abstentions, Article I fell two short
of the two-thirds majority of representatives present and voting required by Rule 20(1) for its adoption. With the failure of Article
I, the President expressed the opinion that it would serve no useful
purpose to vote on the remainder of the Protocol (Articles II to
VII) as they were just formal clauses.
g. Supplementary Protocol to amend the Montreal Convention
When Article I of the Supplementary draft Protocol of the Soviet
Union to amend the Montreal Convention was put to roll-call vote,
it too failed to receive the two-thirds vote required for adoption with
a vote of 42 in favor, 32 opposed and 17 abstentions. The remaining Articles of the Protocol being formal provisions, the President
said that it was pointless to consider them when Article I had not
been adopted.
2. Supplementary Protocol proposed by Greece to amend the
Montreal Convention
The Greek Delegation proposed to add a new sub-paragraph (f)
to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Montreal Convention of 1971 "
to read as follows:
142Article 1 of the Montreal Convention lists a series of unlawful acts against
aircraft and air navigation installations, but does not cover cases of armed attacks
against persons inside the confines of an airport.
Greece had already experienced such an attack. In Israel, a celebrated incident
of this kind was the Lod Airport massacre by Japanese left-wing extremists on
May 30, 1972. See 18 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, July 15-22, 1972, at
25365-67. Further information on such attacks and recent spectacular hijackings
involving airports in a number of countries is given in the Appendix, Part Three.
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performs an act of violence against persons on the ground, particularly within the precincts of an airport or an air terminal, when
such act is detrimental to international civil aviation.
The Delegation also proposed to add, in Article 4 of the Montreal
Convention a new paragraph 6 after paragraph 5 to read as follows:
This Convention shall also apply in the cases mentioned in subparagraph (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 1, if the offender or alleged offender is found in the territory of a State other than that
in which the offence was committed.
Also sub-paragraph (f) would be added to paragraph 2 of Article
5.
a. Commission of the Whole
The Commission of the Whole took certain votes on questions of
principle with respect to the Greek proposal at its 12th Meeting on
September 14. By a vote of 37 to 20, with 31 abstentions, it answered in the affirmative the following question:
Does the Commission wish that, by means of a Supplementary
Protocol open for acceptance by States, there be added to Article
1 of the Montreal Convention the offence described in paragraph 1
of Doc 16?
The Commission also answered in the affirmative, by a vote of 27
to 21, with 39 abstentions, the question:
Does the Commission wish paragraph 2 of Article 5 to apply also
to the offence described in the proposed sub-paragraph (f) of
Article 1, paragraph 1?
The effect of bringing the offence described in paragraph I under
Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Montreal Convention was to require
each Contracting State to take such measures as might be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the event that the
alleged offender was in its territory and it did not extradite him.
The text of the Greek proposal as reported out of the Study
Group (Drafting)" was discussed at the 19th Meeting of the Commission of the Whole on September 20. After various changes had
been made to the text, it was adopted by the Commission of the
Whole by 56 votes to none, with 36 abstentions.
4

CAS Doc. No. 28.
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b. Plenary Meetings
When the Greek text came before the 9th Plenary Meeting of
the Conference, on September 21, it contained the following basic
provisions which had the voting history indicated below:
The following sub-paragraph shall be added to paragraph 1 of
Article 1 of the Convention:
(f) performs an act of violence in an airport serving international
air navigation:
(i) against the persons entrusted within that airport with the
safety of air navigation, if such act is likely to endanger
the safety of aircraft in flight; or
Votes: 46 in favor; 15 opposed; 30 abstentions (Adopted)
(ii) against persons who are in the embarkation or disembarkation phases, if such act is seriously detrimental to
international civil aviation.
Votes: 45 in favor; 23 opposed; 23 abstentions (Failed: Fell
short of the required two-thirds majority by one vote)
Article II
1. The following paragraph 5 bis shall be inserted after paragraph
5 in Article 4 of the Convention:
5 bis. In the cases contemplated in sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 1, this Convention shall apply only if the offender or alleged offender is found in the territory of a State
other than that in which the offence was committed.
2. Paragraph 6 of Article 4 of the Convention shall be amended as
follows:
6. The provisions of paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5 and 5 bis of this
Article shall also apply in the cases contemplated in paragraph 2
of Article 1.
Votes: 46 in favor; 19 opposed; 26 abstentions (adopted)
Article III
Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Convention shall be amended as
follows:
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences
mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1(a), (b), (c) and (f), and
in Article 1, paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph relates to
those offences, in the case where the alleged offender is present
in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article
8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Votes: 40 in favor; 29 opposed; 22 abstenitons (Failed: Fell
short of the two-thirds majority by six votes)

1974]

CONCERTED ACTION

The final clauses, Articles IV to VII, were adopted by 44 affirmative votes, without opposition, but with 28 abstentions.
As amended by the foregoing votes, the Protocol was put to vote
and was 5 votes short of the two-thirds majority required for adoption, with 43 votes in favor, 28 opposed and 20 abstentions.
ADDENDUM TO PART THREE

A. Major Incidents in the second half of 1973, involving
terrorist activities affecting airports
1. Japan Airlines hijacking
On July 20, 1973 a Boeing 747 of Japan Airlines (JAL) was
hijacked from the Netherlands with 145 passengers and crew soon
after take-off from Amsterdam. Shortly before the hijackers took
control of the aircraft, a hand-grenade exploded killing a female
member of the hijacking group and slightly injuring the Japanese
stewards. The aircraft was diverted to Dubai, in the United Arab
Emirates, where it spent three days. It took off again and, after a
brief landing, arrived on July 24 at Benghazi, Libya where it was
blown-up by the remaining four hijackers-including a Japaneseafter the passengers had disembarked. The hijackers were taken
into custody and the Libyan authorities announced that they would
be tried in accordance with Islamic law. (Keesing's Contemporary
Archives, September 10-16, 1973, pp. 26085-26086).
2. Athens Airport attack
On August 5, 1973 three people were killed, a fourth subsequently died at the hospital, and 55 were injured when two Palestinian
Arab terrorists opened fire and threw grenades in the transit lounge
of Athens Airport at a time when it was filled with passengers. The
two guerillas were subsequently arrested.
On July 19, a Palestinian guerilla tried to enter the Athens office
of the Israeli airline El Al, armed with a machine-gun and handgrenades. His attempt failed after a series of events, involving the
holding of hostages. He was subsequently taken to the Athens airport and placed on board a Kuwaiti airliner. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 10-16, 1973, p. 26085).
3. Terrorist Attack on embassy followed by hijacking
On September 5, 1973, a band of Palestinian gunmen occupied
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the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris. On the following day, they
flew first to Cairo to refuel and ultimately landed at Kuwait where,
after troops surrounded the plane and threatened to storm it, the
hostages were freed unharmed and the gunmen surrendered to the
authorities. (The New York Times, September 7, 1973; The
Gazette, Montreal, September 10, 1973).
4. Seizure of missiles near Fiumicino Airport
On September 5, 1973, five Arabs were arrested in Rome a few
hours before they allegedly planned from a site in Ostia to shoot
down an El Al flight from Tel-Aviv using SA-7 man-portable infrared guided missiles with a range of three miles. (Flight International, September 13, 1973, p. 41G; La Presse, Montreal, September
27, 1973).
5. KLM hijacking
On November 25, 1973, three Palestinian terrorists hijacked a
KLM jumbo-jet over Iraq. After proceeding to Damascus, they
took the aircraft to Nicosia and asked for the liberation of seven
Palestinians imprisoned there following attacks on April 7, 1973,
against the Israeli Embassy at Cyprus and against an Israeli aircraft. All 247 passengers and eight stewardesses were released at
Malta on November 26, after long negotiations. After a number of
other stops, the aircraft finally landed in Dubai on November 28
with the three hijackers and a crew of ten. In all, there were six
stops: two in Dubai, one in Damascus, Syria, one in Nicosia, Cyprus, one in Tripoli, and one in Malta, where the passengers were
released in exchange for hostages and fuel. The agreement in Malta
followed an announcement by the Netherlands that "the Dutch
Government pledges that it will not allow the opening of offices or
camps for Soviet Jews going to Israel" and that it would "ban transportation of weapons or volunteers to Israel." (The New York
Times, November 28, 1973). The three hijackers had charges filed
against them by the public prosecutor of Dubai. (The Montreal
Star, November 29, 1973, p. A-11).
6. Attack at Fiumicino Airport
On December 17, 1973, five Arab terrorists killed 30 victims in
a fire-bomb attack in Rome on a Pan-American Boeing 737 and
killed an Italian policeman near the aircraft. They then hijacked

19741

CONCERTED ACTION

a Lufthansa jet and proceeded with a number of hostages to Athens
where they threw out the body of an Italian hostage from the aircraft. After the Greek authorities had refused to release two Palestinian guerillas imprisoned as a result of the attack on Athens airport on August 5, 1973, the new group of terrorists left Athens,
landed at Damascus for a refueling stop and finally landed at Kuwait where they surrendered to Kuwaiti authorities on December
18, after releasing 12 hostages. (The Gazette, Montreal, December 19, 1973, p. 1; The New York Times, December 19, 1973,
p. 1). The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) condemned
the attacks (La Presse, Montreal, December 27, 1973) and sent
a delegation to Kuwait to participate in the Kuwaiti investigation.
Four Moroccan officials having been killed on the Pan-American
aircraft in Rome, it was reported that the PLO was asking that the
terrorists be handed over to it. (The New York Times, December
23, 1973, p. 145; La Presse, Montreal, December 21, 1973; The
Montreal Star, December 20, 1973; The New York Times, December 28, 1973; The Gazette, Montreal, December 26, 1973). As late
as January 4, 1974, it was reported that Arab Governments
were showing reluctance to allow any trial on their territory of the
five terrorists. (The New York Times, January 4, 1973). Italy asked for extradition of the hijackers, but chances of extradition appeared to be slim because there was no extradition treaty between
Italy and Kuwait and no Arab state has so far delivered wanted terrorists to a European country. (The New York Times, December
21, 1973, p. 14C).
B. Chronology of terrorist activities (1968-1973)
For chronology of Palestinian terrorist activities covering twentysix incidents directed against civil aviation between July 23, 1968
and September 5, 1973, see The New York Times, December 20,
1973.
C. Airports' alert in January 1974
Early in January 1974 a massive alert was declared at European
airports because of the fear of more terrorists attacks. (La Presse,
Montreal, January 9, 1974). At the same time, in Canada, the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police ordered tighter security at all airports( The Gazette, Montreal, January 9, 1974).
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PART FOUR

Tentative conclusions
It is obvious that only a series of political accommodations will
serve to reduce or eliminate havens for those who perpetrate acts
of unlawful interference against civil aviation. Steps in this direction have already been taken by the conclusion of bilateral agreements between Cuba and the United States of America,'" Canada
and Cuba,' ' as well as Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.'"
At the time of this writing, there could be some hope that if,
through a major-power consensus, permanent peace could come to
the Middle East as an aftermath of the October War, guerilla attacks against Israeli aircraft and airline offices, as well as against
the aircraft of States which have put guerillas in prison, will
diminish, if not cease all together."'
But in those areas where political accommodations are not achieved and where guerrilla minorities still wish to use acts of terrorism against civil aviation as a means of procuring the release of
terrorist prisoners in national jails, raising funds through ransoming
aircraft, passengers and crew, obtaining publicity for their cause or
escaping from their own particular countries to a safe haven, incidents of unlawful interference may well continue to occur from time
to time.
The problem of the mentally deranged person who will hijack an
aircraft' 8 or of the criminal, who for his own private ends, wishes to
hold an aircraft, passengers or crew for extortion purposes"" is one
'I Cuba-United States: Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels, 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 370-76 (1973).
'4 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Cuba on the Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offences. In force,
Feb. 15, 1973.
146For a report of an agreement between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union
to extradite hijackers, see LC/SC CR (1972) Report, Report of the Special Subcommittee on the Council Resolution of June 19, 1972, at 33.

" For more on these points, see Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What is Being
Done?, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 641 (1973).
'4

The case of the mentally deranged person is exhaustively analysed in D.

HUBBARD,

THE SKYJACKER

(1973).

As witness the cases mentioned in Evans, supra note 147, at 646, see also
the ICAO list of hijackings for the period January 1, 1969, to September 30,
1973. But there have also been some spectacular payments under extortion threats
made for political purposes. See Evans, supra note 147, at 647, for the payment
of $5,000,000 during the hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner.
'
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that cannot be solved by political accommodations so much as
through the use of the technical preventive measures already instituted on a world-wide basis at airports and airport installations '
and through the repressive criminal provisions established nationally and internationally, the latter being contained in the Tokyo,
Hague and Montreal Conventions. '
The foregoing history of the failure to achieve a procedure for
joint action through legal means has been recorded not just as a
confession of failure. Indeed, the history serves to bring into focus
the fact that the argument of those who feel that political matters
are better left with the United Naions may have considerable validity, although it is cold comfort for the victims of unlawful interference to be told that. The history also shows that, in any event, in
spite of the sharply divided opinions as to the nature of a solution
to be adopted for achieving joint action, in spite of the deep difference of views as to whether sanctions should be applied to recalcitrant States and, if so, the nature of such sanctions and, further,
in spite of the uneasiness of the large number of States that opposed
all of the solutions and of the relatively large number which abstained from voting at the Rome meetings, the fact still remains that
0 See Fenello, Technical Prevention of Air Piracy, 585 INT'L CONCILIATION
28 (1971); Maurer, Skyjacking and Airport Security, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 361-80
(1973). ICAO has been very active in the worldwide field of technical preventive
measures, as witness the distribution of an airport security manual, prepared in
1971, and the inclusion of amendments concerning security in Annexes to the
Chicago Convention. However, on December 12, 1973, the ICAO Council failed
by one vote to adopt a separate Annex on Aviation Security, C-WP/5896; C-Min
80/22.
151 For an assessment of the relative success of the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, see Evans, supra note 147, at 667; for an extensive analysis
of the Hague Convention of 1970, see S. SHUBBER, JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES
ON BOARD AIRCRAFT, xxii, 369 (1973). Other recent writings of interest include:
Cheng, The Latest on Hijacking, 77 THE AERONAUTICAL J. 338 (1973); Doty,
Bilaterals May Become Anti-Hijack Tool, 97 AVIATION WEEK 14-15 (1972);
Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What is to be Done?, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 819 (1972);
Horlick, The Public and Private International Response to Aircraft Hijacking,
6 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 144 (1972); Lissitzyn, In-Flight-Crime and United
States Legislation, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 306 (1973); Thomas & Kirby, Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 22
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 163 (1973).
Note: There is a vast literature on the legal aspects of unlawful seizure of
aircraft and unlawful interference with civil aviation. See, W. HEERE, INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AIR LAW 1900-1971 460-68 (1972); the Index to Legal
Periodicals;Smirnoff, Bibliographie internationale sur le probl~me de la piraterie
adrienne, 34 REVUE GiNgRALE DE L'AIR ET DE L'EsPACE 191-99 (1971) (This
bibliography contains 175 entries); HAILBRONNER, LUFTPIRATERIE IN RECHTLICHER
SICHT

120-23 (1972).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

the various texts placed for final voting before the Rome Assembly
and the Rome Conference represented a considerable development
of thoughts that had first been expressed in sketchy form on October
1, 1970, when the ICAO Council first took up the matter on joint
action.
In the long run, however, only big power consensus and a consensus among such contrasting blocks as the Western European
group, the Arabs and Africans could bring about a widely acceptable solution.
What was remarkable about the exercise of the Rome meetings
of August-September 1973 was not that the proposed solutions failed, but that, in spite of the lack of detailed preparation for the meetings and the insufficient time allocated to them for such a gigantic
task, they failed by such narrow margins to adopt some of the solutions put forward. Maybe, some day, a new beginning can be made
on this foundation. But whether the work on the question of joint
action will continue is a matter of pure speculation at the time of
this writing.
The Greek proposal which was aimed at incorporating into the
Montreal Convention acts of violence in an airport against employees and passengers narrowly failed and since it was not concerned directly with the question of havens for terrorists could, at
some future date, possibly be brought forward with some hope of
adoption.

